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Are riots, risings and revolutions acts of collective madness, or are they political 
events, offering a rare glimpse into the inner workings of a system, laying bare the 
legitimacy deficit that moves rational men and women to kill and die? Fun, profit, 
peer pressure, or moral outrage - which of these is the main motive of rioters? Is 
collective violence a form of violent participation, which, in the final analysis, acts 
as the midwife of civil society? The full investigation of these general and 
comparative questions is beyond the scope of my paper. Still, they provide the 
main inspiration for the empirical analysis undertaken here. The paper develops a 
model of conflict resolution based on countervailing powers, the symbolic 
recognition of memories of violence, and new institutional arrangements. This 
framework is used for the analysis of three identity-related issues from post-
independence Indian politics. Two of these have been successfully resolved where 
as attempts to resolve the third have been less successful. Drawing on the 
contributions of Natalie Davis (1973), Ian Gilmour (1992) Pierre Nora (1989) and 
Simon Schama (1989) to collective violence and the foundation of civil societies in 
the west, the paper characterises the outbreak of pogroms, riots, and other forms of 
collective violence as  political  phenomena  that  indicate  deeply  seated  conflicts 
                                                 
1  This paper was presented at the International Seminar on Political and Social Transition 
in India and Europe, at Leipzig University, 29-30 September, 2003. The material presented 
in this paper form part of my project on 'Governance in India', funded by the DFG (German 
Research Council). Access to the opinion data generated by the National Election Study, 
(CSDS, Delhi, 1996) is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank Alexander Fischer, 
Kenneth McPherson, Malte Pehl and Lavanya Regunathan-Fischer for their comments on 
an earlier draft. 
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over the core values of a society. How these conflicts are solved has important 
implications for the establishment of an institutional framework that promotes a 
society based on interpersonal trust, respect of individuals and groups, orderly rule 
and the rights of expression and association. 
 Scholarly interest in the role of violence in accelerating social change has gone 
out of fashion since the general diffusion of utopian ideas like democracy, social 
capital and world governance in western liberal democracies. The insistence of 
donors in the North and their clients in the South on these canons2 as the only 
modes of correct political behaviour has consequence for transitional societies of 
the South that are far from benign.3 Newcomers to the high table of states and 
nations, these candidate-members must earn this privilege by subjecting their 
political conduct to the rules laid down by the members of the club who 
conveniently overlook the tortuous path they themselves have had to take to reach 
their current institutional forms. By the same logic, scholarly inquiries into riots, 
pogroms, insurgencies and other forms of political unrest in non-western societies 
must conform to a prescribed code of conduct by first condemning their subject 
before engaging in an analysis of the social process that has led to its outbreak. The 
liberal bias, often accompanied by the failure to situate the collective violence in its 
context, results in the blatant characterisation of these political acts as bizarre, 
perverse or simply as the proof of the cultural incapacity of the societies where 
they occur to sustain civilised norms in public life. Such a failure of imagination 
and empathy would, in an academic debate, be risible if its costs in terms of 
avoidable suffering were not so immense. 
 It is not my intention in this paper to engage in cultural one-upmanship, nor to 
exonerate human suffering in terms of cultural idiosyncrasy. Instead, the paper 
focuses on the origin and demise of collective violence, meted out by one group 
against another for the sheer reason of their difference. I maintain in this paper that 
the best chance for the creation of a civil society out of the wreckage of collective 
violence consists in grounding one's analysis of its origin firmly  in the social and 
historical context, and keeping the scholarly inquiry as close to the actors as 
possible. Though India is the main empirical context for this paper, the analysis of 
Indian data undertaken here draws on European examples of collective violence 
partly to establish parameters for historical comparison, but also to generate 
analytical space for institutional arrangements that have led to the creation of civil 
societies in the West where much blood has been shed on account of religious 
differences.  
 
 
                                                 
2 It must be added here that in the light of the America-Europe rift on Iraq, the western 
establishment - donor agencies, media, governments and public opinion - does not speak in 
one voice any more. The plurality of the 'North', howsoever weak on issues truly vital to its 
core interests, still holds an important room to manoeuvre for strategists of the 'South'. 
3 This, faute de mieux, is possibly the most widely accepted expression for poor, non-
Western, non-industrial countries, which, at the heyday of post war modernisation euphoria 
used to be referred to with optimistic euphemism as  changing societies or developing 
countries. 
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T H E  I N D I A N  C O N T E X T  
 
The intriguing nature of the Indian example arises from the fact that while her 
politics provide plenty of examples of collective violence, the structure and process 
of her political system demonstrates an endogenous institutional capacity to cope 
with it. When compared to the majority of changing societies, India comes across 
as a case of successful transition from colonial rule and a stagnant economy, to a 
robust democracy, orderly rule and at least for the last decade, vigorous economic 
growth. This record has come under a shadow in recent times on account of sharp 
outbreaks of violent religious riots and their bitter aftermath. The decade that spans 
the destruction of the Babri Mosque of Ayodhya in 1992 by Hindu militants, and 
the Godhra massacre of Hindu pilgrims in 2002 attributed to a Muslim mob4 has 
brought into sharp focus the "mounting anxiety about the future of India".5 The 
inclusive character of the political system has appeared to be on the wane as public 
authorities are accused of being complicit in religious pogroms.6 Communal 
mobilisation, deftly blending historical memories and panoply of material 
grievances, is seen by many analysts as ascendant7. Policemen with long 
experience of violent mobs see the surge in communal antagonism the great 
scourge of the modern state and governance in India. (Rajgopal, 1987) The 'evil of 
communalism' is constantly present in the media.8 India, it is asserted in a series of 
ethnographic reports on the violent world of cultural nationalism, is fragmenting on 
communal lines.9  
                                                 
4  Uday Mahurka "Terror's Mask", India Today, February 24, 2003, p. 40. Televised images 
of the destruction of the Babri mosque and the post-Godhra communal riots have 
accelerated the incorporation of religious fury into everyday politics in India and reporting 
about it abroad. 
5 Varshney, (1993), p. 227. 
6 "How has the Gujarat massacre affected minority women: The survivors speak", in 
http://www.imannet.com/articles/survivorspeak.html. Indian Muslim Alert Network - a 
division of Indian Muslim Council (IMC-USA) www.ImanNet.com. See on April 16, 2002 
7 The concept 'communal' is used in a specifically Indian sense which differs from its 
lexical meaning of "someone who is altruistic and civic-minded". The media and agents of 
the state use it to identify people whose "exclusive attachment to his or her community is 
combined with an active hostility against other communities which share its geographical 
and political space." (Kakar 1995, p. 17) The antonym of communalists in Indian usage are 
'secularists', who do not see any legitimate room for religious symbols in the public sphere 
or religious influences on social, economic and political rules. According to Kakar, the 
intractable character of communal riots derives from the fact that they become "imbued 
with religious ultimacy". Kakar (1995, p. 51)  Wilkinson, (2000), presents ethnic 
mobilisation as the main cause of violence in India on the basis of content analysis of 
newspaper reporting. 
8Described as danga in the vernacular languages of India north of the Vindhyas, 
sampradayikata in the chaster Hindi, communalism in the English language press and 
police reports, conflict between communities is a constant presence  in public as well as 
private conversations.  
9 For ethnographic forays into the violent world of cultural nationalism see Cynthia 
Keppley Mahmood, Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; 1997), Thomas Blom Hansen, Wages of 
Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay (Princeton: Princeton University 
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 In contrast to the chorus of negative prognosis of India's capacity to sustain 
democracy and governance, this paper argues that India's institutional arrangement 
remains basically stable and coherent, particularly with regard to sectarian violence 
based on language, religion, region, caste or class. This paper, whose basic logic 
derives from rational choice neo-institutionalism, asserts that the existence of 
countervailing forces, providing an institutional form for the articulation of 
competing interests, helps juxtapose the accommodative potential of liberalism 
with the power and decisive character of majoritarian democracy. The result is a 
form of security to those whose identities are contested, and to enhance trust in the 
political system, leading, in turn to higher governance. The model of countervailing 
forces active in the Indian political system helps explain the origin of power 
sharing through federalism, empowerment of difference through consociational 
democracy and the validation of individual rights as well as group rights through 
judicialisation to facilitate the accommodation of identities and the reinforcement 
of political trust.10 
 
Figure: Countervailing Forces and the mediation of interests 
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The model is used as a framework of analysis for successful resolution of conflict 
over identity with reference to language and personal law and the current impasse 
on Ayodhya. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
Press) and Paul Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of 
Collective Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1997)   
10 See Subrata Mitra and Alexander Fischer, "Sacred Laws and the Secular State: An 
Analytical Narrative of the Controversy over Personal Law in India", India Review 1(3), 
July 2002, pp. 99-130 for an application of the theory of countervailing powers to the 
analysis of the conflict over personal laws in India. 
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T H E  G O R D O N  R I O T S :  T H E  S T A T E  A N D  C O L L E C T I V E  
V I O L E N C E  I N  E U R O P E A N  P E R S P E C T I V E  
 
Since India’s problems of communal violence is sometimes seen as  sui generis, it 
is useful to analyse the history of transition of societies that now boast of fully 
fledged effective, democratic governments.  For an effective antidote to the 
alarmist view of the current state of India’s democratic institutions we can look at 
the history of popular discontent and disorder, and social transformation of a 
structural kind in England during the eighteenth century.  The general picture that 
we get from Sir Ian Gilmour’s Riots, Risings and Revolution: Governance and 
Violence in Eighteenth-century England11 would be familiar to students of 
contemporary Indian politics. 
 Rampaging crowds taking the law in their own hands, corrupt state machinery 
and ineffectual government at a scale that are familiar to parts of India were not 
altogether unknown in England two centuries ago.12 While in many of the 
eighteenth century English riots one social group vented its anger against another, 
the state was often embroiled in them, sometimes directly. If the state itself was the 
target of civil violence, the other noteworthy feature of these riots was the outright 
inaction or lukewarm performance of the organs of law and order in putting them 
down.  Thus, “Throughout the worst rioting, Justices had been careful to keep out 
of sight.  When they were found, being afraid of the mob’s displeasure, they could 
not be prevailed upon to read the Riot Act.  The Lord Mayor, who had once been a 
waiter in a brothel, when urged to do his duty, replied evasively that the mob 
seemed “to have got hold of some people and furniture they did not like and were 
burning them, and where was the harm in that?”13 
 The English example helps us isolate 'righteous rage' as the key factor which 
gives the decisive edge to collective violence meted out by one section of the 
population against another, and institutional arrangements that aim at the 
restoration of social equilibrium through the accommodation of contested 
identities. The Gordon riots, (England, 1779), so-called after Lord George Gordon, 
Member of the Parliament and the main instigator of the collective violence to 
illustrate a quintessentially European example of a popular uprising on the grounds 
of religious difference. The violence was occasioned by Protestant zealots, 
incensed by an act of Parliament passed in 1778 to remove the restriction on 
Roman Catholics from buying, holding or inheriting land, though the act made 
such freedom conditional upon their taking a 'special oath of allegiance prescribed 
in the act'.14 In course of the riot, prisons and Roman Catholic chapels were burned 
to the ground; the houses of politicians and judges were attacked; distilleries and 
shops were plundered.  One mob attacked Downing Street; another mounted an 
                                                 
11  Gilmour, (1993).  For European illustrations of the taming of the crowd and creation of 
order through the creation of the citizen, see  Tilly  (1975) and Schama, (1989), particularly 
the chapter on "The cultural construction of a citizen", pp 123-174 
12Gilmour, op. cit. p. 16 
13 The "Gordon Riots", see Gilmour, p. 356. 
14 Gilmour (1993), p. 345 
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assault upon the Bank. King George III, on the Attorney-General’s advice, 
eventually authorised army officers to open fire on the mob without the 
intervention of a magistrate.  By nightfall on the last day of the violence, almost a 
thousand people had lost their lives. 
 The English case is interesting but not unique in the history of social 
dislocation, political conflict and state formation in Western Europe.  Tilly (1975) 
and Hobsbawm (1959) inform us of food riots and other challenges to public order 
throughout early modern Europe.  The historical hindsight should help us 
understand the political nature of these riots (as opposed to the view that riots and 
lawlessness are more likely to appear within specific cultures) which left a 
historical residue in the form of the legitimacy of popular protest and the 
combination of redistributive policies and law and order management with which 
the state sought to cope with them. 
 In a historical and comparative perspective, the analysis undertaken here 
asserts that a hiatus between values held as sacred by the society, and the core 
institutions of the state, creates the potential for communal conflict. When the state 
is seen as violating what ordinary people and their leaders consider sacred and non-
negotiable, resistance, even at the cost of life and limb, appears as the only method 
to save one's dignity. Disaffected groups, as we see in the succinct analysis of 
religious violence in sixteenth century France by Natalie Davis (1973) seek to 
assert their identity by temporarily assuming the roles of the state and the church. 
Just as a deficit in legitimacy is the main cause of communal violence, the 
restoration of trust by institutional methods that provide security to contested 
identities, is an effective method to restore social peace and governance. 
 Though a radical decline of legitimacy is a necessary cause of communal 
violence, it is not sufficient by itself. Communal violence, like in all cases of 
collective action, requires a whole range of facilitating factors such as the 
reassuring weight of numbers, and divine blessing in the form of the support of 
dissident clergy. Violent resistance in the specific case of the defence of identity, 
culture and dignity, or to settle scores against outrages to the identity and modesty 
of one's kin are not easy to explain with conventional model of instrumental 
behaviour. The incentives in this case are endogenous, for the actor sees retaliatory 
action, which inevitably acquires the character of an affront to lawful authority, as 
an important goal in its own right.  
 Institutional changes that incorporate the salient features of competing 
identities into the constitution, and in the process, puts them beyond political 
contention, can restore social equilibrium, and create conditions for social harmony 
and trust. These arguments are illustrated through brief references to the rise and 
decline of contentious issues like language and personal law. It also makes a 
reference to the competing claims on Ayodhya as a site of conflicting memories for 
Hindus and Muslims, and a battle for exclusive ownership and right to worship 
which has now spread beyond its epicentre where once the Babri mosque stood, as 
legend has it, on the top of a temple that marked the spot as the sacred birthplace of 
Rama. The narratives weave in and out of conflicts and looks, prompting the search 
for a meta-narrative of core values and a common institutional space, a fixed point 
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of reference, an implicit commanding height for the authoritative allocation of 
values among communities locked in battle. In Indian conditions, one is led to 
conclude, such efforts are best done surreptitiously, through the innovation of 
countervailing forces that juxtapose the government of the day with the opposition, 
independent commissions and the media, with the judiciary and posits 
judicialisation of conflicts over sacred beliefs as an effective complement to the 
forces of politics. 
 
T H E  C A S E  A G A I N S T :  E T H N I C I S A T I O N  O F  
C O M M U N A L  V I O L E N C E  I N  I N D I A  
 
The applicability of a transactional model that recognises a potential for 
transforming deep cultural divisions into a civil society through the application of 
countervailing forces and institutional arrangements has had a distinguished history 
of contestation. Shortly after India's independence as the quickening of the pace of 
political participation started giving voice to cultural divisions and anxieties that 
underpinned Indian society, the scepticism that many had about India's capacity for 
self-governance came to the fore. Selig Harrison (1960) led the chorus. "India's 
struggle for national survival is a struggle against herself. As a civilization and as 
an integrated cultural whole, India has shown a power of survival rivalled only by 
China. But multilingual India's separate territories have failed as consistently as 
Europe's to hold together as a political unity."15 Harrison's prognosis was deeply 
pessimistic, "Deep-seated centrifugal forces on the one hand, and the quite 
contradictory urge for unified national power in the face of the unity of others, will 
act and interact too convulsively to leave India's present Constitution undisturbed. 
This interaction between extremes is characteristic of the most dangerous decades, 
those decades after an underdeveloped country has discovered progress, or the 
hope of progress, but before progress comes rapidly enough to satisfy rising 
aspirations."16  
 The scepticism of India's potential for self-governance and civil society that 
was occasioned by language riots have re-emerged after a gap of several decades in 
the form of a cluster of ethnographic narratives that find the same danger in the 
outbreak of communal violence.17 Focused on irreconcilable differences of faith 
leading to violent confrontations between exclusive, homogenous masses, 
ethnographic studies contest the capacity of normal political transaction, 
participation, redistributive policies and law and order management to deliver 
democratic governance. If, as the minority women's report on Gujarat riots point 
out, the agents of communalism-driven politics are psychopathic killers and not 
political actors, and lawmakers, administrators and policemen are complicit in 
criminality, then what confidence can one have in the ability of the state to 
                                                 
15 Harrison (1960), p. 3 
16 ibid., p. 5 
17 See Hansen (19??), Mahmood (1997), Brass (1997), Jaffrelot (2003). These ethnographic 
narratives are contested by scholarship emerging from political science. See Kohli, (2001) 
Varshney, (2002) and  Mitra, (1999). 
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maintain any degree of governance?18 The prospects of democratic governance are 
indeed grim when a general election, the cutting-edge of Indian democracy, as 
some have argued with regard to the assembly elections on 2002 in Gujarat, 
focuses not so much on the performance of candidates as on "fear and hatred".19 By 
this reckoning, though India has been relatively successful in terms of mitigating 
the extremes of class conflict through its imaginative institutional arrangement, the 
communal divisions in society have found their way into the institutional structure 
and process, rendering them impotent in the face of communal violence. 
 The very metaphors used in ethnographic narratives such as the 'virus of 
communalism', the 'cancer', the creeping fascism of the state, the criminalisation of 
the police and politicians, sustain the general image of a slide into anarchic, 
violent, politically fragmented society. My approach questions this sense of fatality 
that is the stock in trade of ethnographic studies. Our model offers an alternative 
explanation which conceptualises communal riots as collective political conflicts, 
amenable to political analysis. It presents communal politics not as an aberration 
and an exasperating descent into irrationality but as an extension of normal politics 
into areas previously considered unproblematic. Instead of taking a flight from 
politics, the approach adopted here formulates communal violence as the 
deepening of politics through the problematisation of deeper layers of politics 
locked into a state of suspended animation by the political status quo.20 While 
drawing on the qualitative data that ethnographic accounts provide to the inner 
world of the actor, the neo-institutional approach of this paper seeks to string these 
micro-narratives into a macro framework capable of engendering political trust and 
social equilibrium, sustained by countervailing forces, and, capable of enhancing 
governance and civil society. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The team met Maya Kodnani, BJP MLA from Naroda Patia, one of the worst affected 
areas of Ahmadabad. She has been named  as an accused in an FIR as having participated 
in the mayhem in Naroda Patia. She showed no remorse at the State's inability to prevent 
Naroda Patia. There was nothing the State could do, she says. There was a natural ghrina 
(hatred) and aakrosh (rage) in the heart of every Hindu and we could not control it. "It was 
impossible to stop. There were between 50,000 and 1,00,000 people out on the streets. How 
could the police have stopped them? It was impossible to move about in Ahmedabad that 
day", she says. She continues to justify "Hindu Aakrosh" by speaking at length about 
Godhra. When the train from Godhra came in to Ahmedabad carrying bodies of the victims, 
it was truly horrible", she says. And when these bodies were taken by relatives to their 
home towns and villages, naturally the anger spread across the state. People began to feel, 
Terrorism ke khilaaf kuch to action hona chahiye. IDSI bhi involved thi. Aur phir Gujarat 
ki prakriti hi aisi hai. Jab bhi kuch communal hota hai, hamesha phailta hai. (There has to 
be some action against terrorism. ISI was also involved. And Gujarat's essential nature is 
such that whenever there is communal tension it spreads.)" Annexture 2.1. Minority 
women: survivorspeak, op.cit. 
19 Ashish Nandy, in Suman Jha, "Gujarati Primer", The Times of India, New Delhi 2 
January, 2003. 
20 See the two essays by  Bachrach and Baratz, (1962) and (1963)  for the process through 
which dominant social groups succeed in keeping some issues off the agenda, at least for a 
while. 
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R I O T E R S  I N T O  S T A K E H O L D E R S :  C O U N T E R V A I L I N G  
F O R C E S ,  P O L I T I C A L  T R U S T  A N D  G O V E R N A N C E  
 
Though I prefer to use the more neutral category of cultural nationalism to denote 
cultural and symbolic factors that deeply affect political choices, the paper remains 
focused on conflict relating to identity, the operational category through which the 
Indian society and state define it as communal. This corresponds to the definition 
of religious riots by Natalie Davis who defines religious riots as "any violent action 
with words or weapons, undertaken against religious targets by people who are not 
acting officially and formally as agents of political and ecclesiastical authority. As 
food rioters bring their moral indignation to bear upon the state or the gain market, 
so religious rioting bring(s?) their zeal to bear upon the state of men's relations to 
the sacred." (1973, p. 52. Emphasis in original) The outbreak of a communal riot, 
or even the rumour that one might be in the offing activates a conditioned reflex in 
the minds of individual citizens as well as in the agents of the state. Communal 
riots, as the psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar writes, particularly those between Hindus 
and Muslims, invoke the subliminal trauma of the Partition of 1947 handed down 
from one generation to another. They bring back the historical memory of foreign 
invasions, suffering, humiliation, fear, anger and a sense of loss. The Republic of 
India started its career with the greatest communal carnage in recorded history - a 
horror that remains in the subconscious as a chosen trauma, for no public catharsis 
has been organised though truth commissions or symbolic elevation of the victims 
into survivors by giving their collective memories canonical status through public 
symbols of grief and repentance. Communal riots then remain as the reminders of 
unfinished business, the fragility of peace, the soft underbelly of outwardly strong 
and stable institutions of the modern state, of one's own vulnerability, or, 
symmetrically, a superhuman potency to set the historical wrongs right, that cannot 
and must not find free play in normal times. 
 A sense of traison des clercs - of having been let down by their superiors who 
should have known better - fuels the moral anger that goes into the making of the 
fury of the crowd in religious violence. However, we learn from historical evidence 
from Europe and current information from India that the little man, killing, 
maiming, raping, looting, and getting killed, maimed etc. is no anonymous face in a 
mass gone mad. The agents of moral violence and their victims are often ordinary 
family men, artisans, and peasants, working for a cause.21 These actors from 
                                                 
21 A working class Muslim family of four including two children has recently been taken 
into custody for their suspected role in two bomb blasts in Mumbai. Bugger: it should be 
India Today in italics!  reports with typical abandon on their motives "Terrorists did not 
look like this, an ordinary family on an ordinary outing. Terrorists didn't have settled 
homes, jobs, neighbours, a life outside dogma. Terrorists carried guns, not little girls in 
their laps. They didn't have families. If they did, they never took them to work.  After 
Mumbai's Black Monday, it is clear the old rules don't apply." The emphasis here is on the 
ordinariness of the actors of one of the most violent, cold blooded murder of a large number 
of civilians as an act of revenge. "The police say Fahmida shows no remorse for her 
actions. When asked about the innocent deaths she had caused, she allegedly said, 'It is 
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religious violence in Europe at the intersection of the medieval period and the 
modern age are recognised as such by their historians three centuries later. Their 
Indian counterparts have done less well at the hands of their historians, though one 
should have thought, thanks to the proximity in time and greater accessibility of the 
sources, their scholarly toil would have been more productive in terms of 
enlightening the reader of the motives that unleashed such passion and fury.  
 To put it bluntly, there is no other explanation for the difference in treatment of 
the western and non-western religious rioters except scholarly contempt for the 
capacity of the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Buddhist crowds to engage in rational 
action, and the failure to appreciate the powerful appeal of the religiosity of these 
religions on the minds of men and women, just like the French Catholics and 
Huguenots locked in mortal combat three centuries ago or in contemporary 
Northern Ireland. That some of these negative readings are actually provided by 
scholars from the same racial origin as the Indian rioters, who, despite their 
common origin fail to see what was obvious to their subjects, only goes to show 
how solid and secure the hold of orientalism continues to be on the imagination of 
otherwise intelligent men and women. 
 We learn from ethnographic accounts that when 'communal' riots break out, or 
riots are given a communal complexion, politics shifts gear. Riot mangers become 
riot-mongers and manipulate the reconstruction of the course of events to suit their 
hypotheses. In contrast, the analysis undertaken here conceptualises communal 
riots as sites of conflict, and shared, painful memories of loss; of conflicts among 
competing departments of the government and the media for ownership of the 
facts; and, bitter rivalry among academic specialists whose own legitimacy derives 
from competing paradigms of violent, collective behaviour. The mixed motives 
attributed to communal riots give free play to theoretical hobby horses by 
specialists, drawing on core concepts such as class antagonism, indifferent or 
inadequate policing, violence targeted at particular communities with the specific 
purpose of land or business-grabbing, violent outburst of a collective 
subconscious.22 Tales of savagery and perversity, lurid media accounts of violence 
against women make accounts of specific riots disappear and reappear as parts of 
larger problems. The statistics of communal riots are thus necessarily unreliable, 
nor can they form part of "any neat theory".23 However, to argue that no 'neat' 
                                                                                                                            
nothing compared to the rape and murder of innocent, pregnant women in Gujarat.' 
Fahmida, say the police, echoes her husband's virulence and anger at the communal riots in 
Gujarat, using that emotion to fuel their rage against civil society." "New Faces of Terror", 
India Today, September 22, 2003, pp. 14-15 
 
22 Gopal Krishna, (1985), p. 66, based on incidents of communal violence, 1961-70, 
recorded by the Home Ministry of India, describes the causes of communal violence as 
follows: Festivity or celebrations, 26.75%, private property disputes, 19.26%, quarrels over 
women, 16.89%, personal transactions or enmities, 16.53%, cow slaughter, 14.39%, 
desecration of religious places, 4.04% disputes over graveyards, 2.14%. 
23 "Above all, how the members of the respective communities perceive each other's 
conduct at the street level is what determines the eruption and the scale of communal 
violence. Thus considered, there is not much scope for formulating what in effect is an 
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theory is possible is not the same as to assert that communal violence, or more 
generally, cultural nationalism are out of bounds for political analysis. The issue is: 
to what extent can one extend the normal analytical tools of political science to the 
dissection of the violent rage and collective outburst to rational, action pursued by 
goal-oriented individuals rather than merely irrational, pathological behaviour by 
mobs driven by hatred, profit, lust and fun? 
 Beyond the fact that communal riots are "occasions for giving expression to the 
pent-up anger [of] individuals and groups ... against the system as a whole"24 there 
is little consensus among scholars about their underlying causality. At one extreme 
is the welfarist position that conceptualises communal riots as "articulating secular 
needs of the community on communal lines" though the immediate targets are the 
visible symbols of authority and the system. The prime cause for this anger is lack 
of work, lack of decent housing and other civic amenities and the lack of hope that 
things would improved in the near future. Also belonging to this genre are 
arguments that attribute an instrumental character to community mobilisation by 
manipulative leaders who wish to further their own material goals through such 
efforts.25 At the other extreme are those who see a communal riot as the tip of the 
iceberg of an underlying, irreconcilable disagreement, derived from historical 
memories which renders intercommunal bridge-building impossible, and in effect, 
renders territorial exclusiveness as the only solution. Indifferent or insufficient 
policing is a supplementary argument that acts as a multiplier in both hypotheses 
regarding the causality that underpins rival explanations of communal riots.26 For 
an analytical and comparative understanding of communal violence, it is important 
to move beyond these polarised oppositions, and examine empirically grounded 
accounts that offer the potential for detailed, theoretical analysis.  
                                                                                                                            
irrational impulsive aggressiveness within the confines of a neat sociological theory." 
Rajgopal (1987, p. 21) 
24 Rajgopal, 1987, p. 22 
25"According to the survey, the 1984 riots were largely the outcome of business rivalry, 
though the immediate provocation was provided by the Shivaji jayanti procession. The 
well-entrenched and the newly emerging traders came to perceive competition between 
them in trade along religious lines. When the competition happens to be between merchants 
belonging to two religious groups, communal motives are imputed for the success or the 
failure of the different groups. During the riots of 1965 and 1982 in Pune and 1970 in 
Bhiwandi it was the anti-social elements who provoked the riots. In the subsequent stages 
of the 1984 riots in Bhiwandi a section of builders used anti-social elements to get vacated 
their lands where powerloom workers had constructed jhuggis converting their properties 
into slums. Some of the loom owners incidentally also developed a vested interest in 
prolonging the communal riots so that they could buy looted beams of yarn from the anti-
social elements. This also enhanced the duration in intensity of the riots. Some of these 
exemplars give one the impression that riots are becoming economic goal oriented." 
(Rajgopal, p. 81)  
26 "These elements, given time, will soon disappear into the sanctuaries from where they 
will  continue to stoke the communal fire. Once the rioters get the initial impression that the 
authorities are weak or indecisive in the use of force, the riot spreads fast and wide, taking 
in its wake avoidable loss in terms of the innocent lives and property. This is exactly the 
message that went down in Ahmedabad in 1985, whether it was intended or not."(Rajgopla, 
p. 85) 
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 Rajgopal, drawing on his long professional experience as a former police 
officer explains why rioters burn cars and loot shops in terms of potential rewards 
for communal entrepreneurship27: low threats of sanctions28, anonymity of rioters29. 
                                                 
27 "There are 14 districts with a Muslim majority and 114 districts where their share of the 
population is 15% and above, against the national figure of 12%. There has been an 
increase in the number of Muslim MPs in the Parliament in the 80s. There were 32 Muslim 
M P s in the 1977 Parliament, 45 Muslim M P s in 1980 and 42 in the 1984/1985 
Parliament. There are 120 Parliamentary and 700 Assembly constituencies all over the 
country in which the voting pattern of Muslims could be a decisive factor in tipping the 
balance one way or the other. Hence the political parties make a special mention in the 
respective election manifestoes of what they want to do for the Muslims in the event of 
their getting elected. The considerations that go into the calculation of the average Muslim 
voter are the short-term rather than long-term interests and the extent to which the 
candidate himself is sympathetic to the cause of the Muslims. The Muslims are keenly 
conscious of the extent to which they can influence the composition of a state legislature 
and their leadership understandably has not been averse to advising them on the lines which 
will best suit the interest of the community. The nature and content of the advice thus has a 
lot to do with  the communal outlook of the leaders themselves." (Rajgopal, 1987, pp. 69-
71) 
28 "The total strength of the town police officers and men in Bhwandi in 1984 was about 
250 distributed over three police stations. One company (99 men) of Special Reserve Police 
was attached to Bhwandi, Thane and Kalyan after the 1970 riots. At the time of the 1970 
riots in Bhiwandi there was only one Police station which was increased to three after the 
riots. As a result of the 1984 riots there has been an increase by about 300 men as against 
the Police Department's estimated requirement of about 800 men. Many of the police 
personnel stay in the slums of Bhiwandi for want of official quarters. In the process the 
possibility of the police personnel absorbing a part of the slum culture cannot be ruled out. 
The effect that this would have when they are called upon to handle riots when these occur 
is not difficult to imagine. [...] The Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial 
Development, Chandigarh, did a study in August 1985 of the communal violence in 
Bhiwandi in 1894 and Pune in 1982 and its impact on development and national 
integration. According to this study, a majority of powerloom workers who happen to be 
Hindus in certain areas of Bhwandi complained about the lack of health care, education, 
sanitation and drinking water facilities in the localities. These workers considered the 
neglect of their localities to be an issue designed b the majority of the Muslims who 
dominated the Municipality, to make life miserable for the Hindu minority. The merchant 
manufactures who happen to be Ansari Muslims, residing in certain areas of Bhiwandi 
complained that Hindu traders delayed payment for cloth that they sold them and deduced 
illegitimate 'kardhas' or discounts as they are a helpless Muslim minority in India. These 
merchants wanted a new cloth market to be constructed in Bhiwandi and felt that only such 
a market could save the Muslims from Hindus. This demand for a new cloth market is 
opposed by the Hindus, as according to them, such a market in Bhiwandi will sound the 
death-knell of Hindu control over the cloth trade." (Rajgopal, 1987, pp. 80-81)  
29 "The fact remains that it is a very difficult to get to know the real offenders who commit 
these crimes unless they are caught on the spot by independent witnesses or by the 
authorities themselves. This is a very rare phenomenon, the result inevitably is that 
communal riot cases seldom end in conviction and therefore the criminal proceedings 
following the riots have seldom acted as a deterrent in the prevention and handling of 
subsequent communal riots. In this connection, the statement given in table 11 (detailed 
account of arrests and convictions) about the registered cases arising out of the Bhiwandi 
riots of 1984 and their disposal should set at rest doubts if any about the utter futility of all 
the police efforts that follow during and after the riots by way of arrests, investigations and 
prosecutions of those alleged to have participated in the riots. Out of the 611 cases 
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Not to be ignored, however, are the intrinsic psychological and material rewards 
for riotous behaviour. For at least a little while the rioter is someone. He and the 
fellow rioters have an identity. The police confront them and the leaders appeal to 
them for peace.  The media swoop on them. For once, on such occasions, they get 
the satisfaction of being noticed as individuals in their own right.  
 
P O A C H E R S  I N T O  G A M E K E E P E R S :  I N S T I T U T I O N A L  
S O L U T I O N S  T O  C O N F L I C T  O V E R  L A N G U A G E  
 
Compared to the first years after independence, language30 in India is no longer the 
burning issue that it once used to be. Though there continue to be from time to time 
frayed tempers and the odd demonstration, rarely does one come across the violent 
agitation that used to be routine in the 1950s on the issue of language as the key 
element of identity.31 The Indian achievement in this regard provides a contrast to 
more established democracies like Canada or Belgium where language continues to 
be a salient issue of everyday politics. Politics of the 1950s, following the high 
drama of the Partition, integration of the Princely States and nation-wide expansion 
of universal adult franchise was very much the decade of language conflict. 
Though the Indian National Congress had already accepted the centrality of 
language to Indian politics by organising its provincial units on the basis of the 
mother tongue in the early 1920s, and had shown considerable sympathy to the 
elevation of the mother tongue to the status of the official language of the region, 
once independence was achieved, the modernist Nehru, railed against the 'disease 
of nationalist', fervently believed that "that language loyalty, like other forms of 
tribal loyalty such as religion, caste, and class, could be placed in the museum of 
irrational beliefs and outmoded caprice" (King, 1998: 27).  
 Nehru finally gave in to the demand for linguistic States when Potti Sriramulu, 
the Telugu leader fasted unto death on the issue of the creation of a linguistic State 
for Telugu speakers. This led to the setting up of the States' Reorganisation 
Commission in 1957 whose recommendations led to the radical re-drawing of 
                                                                                                                            
registered only 185 cases i.e., 30.8 per cent of the cases were sent up to the court in 
May/June 1984. Of these, as many as 113 cases i.e., 61 percent were acquitted and only 
four cases, repeat only four cases had ended in conviction by January 1986, i.e. after a lapse 
of eighteen months. They are not likely to fare any better. That this would have been the 
result in a state like Maharashtra where the administration generally and police 
administration in particular still enjoy a degree of reputation for effectiveness and 
purposefulness is a matter of concern." (Rajgopal, 1987, p, 91) 
30 King refers to the political salience of language to its iconic role, one that "can serve 
either as a badge of membership in the community or as a means of exclusion and exile.... 
an ‘icon’ that evokes murderous impulses in human beings, that even the written form of a 
language could goad people into murder and fury" (King 1998: 29). 
31 See Hardgrave, (1993), pp. 81-91 for the specific case of language based communal riots 
and Selig Harrison's India: The Most Dangerous Decades for the general threat of identity 
conflict to the prospects for political order and stability in the nascent, post-colonial state. 
Communal riot between Hindus and Muslims broke out in Badaun on 28 September 1989 
following the decision of the Uttar Pradesh government to make Urdu the second official 
language of for the regional administration. The battle for Urdu became a symbol abd an 
icon of ethnic pride and religious self-respect. See King, (1998), p. X 
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India's internal boundaries, creating States primarily based on mother tongue. 
Some problems survived. Thus, Bombay continued to be based on a divided 
identity between Marathi and Gujarati speakers. Until 1961 Punjab remained 
India’s only seriously bilingual state, with both Hindi and Punjabi spoken by 
almost equal proportions of the population. The difference between the Hindi and 
Punjabi spoken there was not great linguistically but enormously great 
symbolically – and iconicity, for Punjabi had rightly or wrongly a ‘Sikh’ 
identification, Hindi a ‘Hindu’ identification. Sikhism was in resurgence, and, 
moreover, to add to the problem of identity, Sikhs were moving more and more 
towards the Gurmukhi script for Punjabi in place of the Devanagari or Perso-
Arabic script. Gurmukhi was the script of the sacred texts of the Sikh religion and 
thus of sublime iconic implication.  
 With the resolution, in 1956, of most of the linguistic province issues, language 
went into terminal decline as a marker of political identity and source of political 
mobilisation. Through subsequent creation of further federal units on the basis of 
language and cultural identity around a relatively stable core of current States, 
King believes, India might have found an effective and a dynamic solution to a 
vexed problem that has split Pakistan and continues to haunt the leaders of Sri 
Lanka.32 The sites of the battle for the mother tongue are now hallowed shrines in 
India's regional States, with statues of their leaders adorning state buildings and 
public parks. The political residue, enshrined into India's public law, is now the 
basis of linguistic rights and dignity for the speakers of minority languages.33 
 
I N D I A ' S  P E R S O N A L  L A W :  F R O M  C O N F L I C T  
T O  A C C O M M O D A T I O N  
 
India's personal laws, covering matrimonial matters, guardianship, adoption, 
succession and religious institutions, have long been a source of political 
controversy. The 'modern, secular and progressive' opinion in the Constituent 
Assembly hoped that the controversy would soon die out under the impact of the 
new social legislation which would set the "spirit of a nation, long suppressed", 
                                                 
32 “In creating a system of essentially linguistic states, India has provided a local political 
milieu that is conducive to the flowering of many linguistically-rooted cultures and thereby 
evolved a system which greatly enriches the cultural life of the nation as a whole... It is the 
Indian Paradox: if you do not decentralise you will balkanise. If the many centres of which 
India consists have control at least of their culture and language, they fret less about the 
culture and language pretensions of the national centre. The linguistic states provide the 
means through which the regional cultures maintain their traditions and orient their 
citizenry towards their history.” King, p. 212 
33A series of provisions have been incorporated into the Indian Constitution to ensure the 
rights of minority languages. (Art 19 (1), 29, 30, 350A, 350B). These articles form the basis 
of legislation by the Centre and State governments. The implementation of the 
constitutional intent is further reinforced with a wide range of case laws produced by the 
Supreme Court and State High Courts. Finally, there are semi-judicial measures like 
Executive Orders, Notifications and Memos which help meet specific needs and eventually 
find their way into the wider structure of the governance of culture.  
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free.34 Those opposed to the social engineering efforts of an interventionist state, 
led by intellectuals and legislators hailing principally from the majority Hindu 
community, perceived a general threat to their dignity as well as identity in such 
endeavours. They used every method available to them to countermand or sabotage 
statutory changes, and to delay their implementation when attempts to resist 
legislation had been to no avail. It does not come as a surprise then, that fifty years 
after Independence the debate on personal laws is far from closed in India and the 
legal regimes governing Indian families still vary according to community, sect and 
region. Many have viewed the co-existence of diverging matrimonial laws for 
Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Christians and Jews within a single polity as an obstacle 
to the 'progress of a modern nation'. As evidence of this line of thinking, one can 
see how explicit provision for a uniform civil code has found its way into the 
Directive Principles of State Policy – a non-binding part of the Indian Constitution. 
But the implementation of the principle of "one-territory-one-code" has been 
continuously contested. In the cut and thrust of India's robust and competitive 
democracy, the issue of a uniform civil code has emerged as a constant presence on 
the national political agenda, its intensity varying according to the context and the 
conjuncture.35 
 As a general principle of politics, it can be suggested that the imposition of 
uniform rules from above by executive fiat, parliamentary legislation, or judicial 
rulings would be perceived as an illegitimate intrusion into the private domain in 
the eyes of communities subject to them. We learn this from the controversy 
surrounding the Hindu Code Bill in the 1950s as well as the more recent Shah 
Bano case, discussed below in detail. For instance, polygamy or polyandry, 
practised by some communities but not the population as a whole, contradict the 
principle of equality from a strictly formalistic, constitutional point of view. But, a 
different view might emerge if one looks at these institutions from the point of 
view of the actors concerned, i.e. the men and women who live them out on a day-
to-day basis. The potential contradiction between individual right to equality and 
the collective right to identity is inescapable, if one is to take the democratic right 
to freedom of choice seriously. The analyst's dilemma, therefore, is to have to 
address the issue of personal laws simultaneously through the high politics of the 
state, legal institutions and the constitution, as well as at the level of the everyday 
issues of the politics of allocation, elections, coalitions and the sentiments of 
ordinary people. Correspondingly, the stance chosen by the Indian state is to 
approach the personal law system from above as well as below. A constellation of 
countervailing forces makes it possible for the post-colonial state to innovate new 
institutions which integrate modern and pre-modern values and rules of social 
                                                 
34 The envisioned tone and design of the functioning of new Republic are emblematically 
brought to light in Jawaharlal Nehru's famous speech "Tryst with Destiny"; see  Mitra 
(1990). 
35 The interaction between state law and religion easily takes the shape of a political crisis. 
Whether one deals with the prohibition of polygamous marriages, temple entry legislation 
or the abolition of animal sacrifice, the conflict between a ”modern” constitutional 
discourse and the religious claims to ”truth” seems to be unavoidable and inherent in the 
political context of post-colonial India. 
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transactions within a single constitutional set up rather than mechanically applying 
the framework of tradition versus modernity. 
 The State governments are, however, not totally bereft of influence. The whole 
area of the maintenance of Hindu religious property is governed by the State 
governments through their Devaswam Boards. States, through their right to 
legislate in the matters of education, and general responsibility for law and order 
which becomes salient with regard to rules governing religious processions, also 
play a role. But, if the State government acts in a manner which some communities 
consider deeply offensive, and express their resentment in a manner that disturbs 
the peace and makes lawful government impossible, then the Union Executive has 
the right to intervene, to the extent of declaring a state of Emergency and ruling the 
State directly. These institutional provisions for countervailing powers with regard 
to administrative and legislative competence in matters of personal law are further 
enriched by another set of institutional and quasi-institutional provisions, 
originating from a process of judicialisation36 - the power of the Supreme Court 
and the High Courts to 'make laws' and to reform as well as create legal institutions 
through rulings and interpretations.  
 The model of judicialisation is, first and foremost, based upon a dyadic social 
structure, characterised by relations of direct exchange between individuals or 
social groups bound to each other by established principles of reciprocity; i.e. the 
legal and political actors that transact within the domain of family law. As "dyadic 
forms are inherently unstable […] because each party faces powerful incentives to 
ignore normative obligations"37 the triadic entity introduces the authority of a 
dispute solver as a third party. Finally, triadic dispute resolution usually functions 
within a normative structure which can be described as a set of institutions, laws, 
customs or simply the rules of the game. Thus, judicialisation describes a process 
that stabilises dispute settlement mechanisms by sustaining an interdependence of 
dyads, triad and rules; simultaneously, judicialisation techniques constantly adapt 
the normative structure to the demands of a dispute in the process of its resolution. 
The judicialisation of politics is the process by which triadic dispute resolution and 
lawmaking is shifting towards the sphere of judges and legalism. Applying this 
model to the controversies surrounding India's personal law system it is argued that 
judges have increasingly asserted their own authority in the governance of the 
Indian family while legislative politics, operating on the basis of majority rule has 
partly failed in finding a systematic solution to the democratic puzzle of personal 
laws as a minority problem. 
 In addition, there are independent commissions like the National Minorities 
Commission and Human Rights Commission, funded by the state to act as a 
watchdog of minority interests. What is more, the minorities themselves are also 
directly involved in the evolution of Indian family laws via their respective 
personal law boards and other religious or legal organisations.38 In decreasing order 
                                                 
36 See Sweet, (1999) (32: 2), pp. 147-184. 
37 Ibid., p.149. 
38 A case in point is the instrumental role the Parsi community in general, and the Bombay 
Parsi Panchayat in particular, played in the passing of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
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of formality, but no less effective for that matter, are radio, television, print media 
and the internet which reflect the diversity of opinions resulting from national, 
regional and local perspectives; views of different communities as well as interest 
groups.39 Finally, the process of coalition building, made imperative by the first 
past the poll electoral laws of India lead to cross-regional and communal 
bargaining. These processes of federal and consociational arrangements and 
resulting accommodation of diversity40 takes the form of countervailing forces. 
 Following independence and the installation of Congress governments both at 
the centre and in the provinces under the overall leadership of Pandit Nehru, the 
legislatures and courts got busy in the passing of legislation intended to standardise 
personal law.41 A quick perusal of these Acts makes it abundantly clear that 
whereas the state has been quite active in the matter of the reform of personal law 
with regard to Hindus, the same does not hold for comparable measures with 
regard to Muslims except some changes brought about as by-products of other 
                                                                                                                            
(Amendment) Act, 1988. Another example of the importance of social groups is the All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board which has consistently fallen short of consensus on 
"even the barest essentials for the codification of Muslim law" due to its fractionalisation. 
"Sunni, Shi'a Isma'ili, Ahl-e-Hadith, etc. regard each other's school of law as un-authentic"; 
see Tahir Mahmood, Uniform Civil Code – Fictions and Facts (India and Islam Research 
Council: New Delhi) 1995, p. 172. 
39 See Vimal Balasubrahmanyan, In Search of Justice – Women, Law, Landmark 
Judgements and Media (Shubhada Saraswat Prakashan: Pune) 1990. One of the most 
immediate issues arising in this discussion is the important Supreme Court decision in Bai 
Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia All India Reporter (hereafter AIR), 1979 SC 362, 
which already had set a clear precedent in favour of the maintenance rights of a divorced 
Muslim woman a couple of years before the Shah Bano case. Although, the substantive 
legal reasoning of both cases runs parallel to all intents and purposes, Bai Tahira caught no 
attention of the media while Shah Bano not only made it to the headlines but eventually 
triggered rioting (ibid. pp. 40-1). The absence of media coverage in one case and extensive, 
politicised publicity of the other, then, makes for one of the many indicators that point to 
the multitude of countervailing factors which inform the personal law controversy. 
40 Lijphart, (1996) (90: 2), pp. 258-68. 
41 A few examples would suffice. The first legislative activity of India’s independent 
Parliament resulted in the new Special Marriage Act, 1954, a secular code that was not 
mandatory but allowed Indian citizens to opt for a civil marriage. In quick succession, there 
followed, after 18 years of committee work and debate, four major fragments of the Hindu 
Code: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. A second important 
reform of Hindu law was initiated in 1976, based on the 59th Report of the Law 
Commission, when Parliament passed the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 
modifying the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. What is 
more, there have been very important modifications of Hindu law by local legislators, 
executing their jurisdiction to alter, repeal and amend the personal laws and customs in 
terms of article 372 of the Constitution as this jurisdiction has been shared by the Centre 
and states in accordance with article 246 (read with Entry 5 of List III in the Seventh 
Schedule). The most important local Acts are the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 
1980; Madras Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1967; Kerala Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act, 1958. Further, the central state, by means of changes in the criminal 
law, has rewritten the traditional laws relating to dowry, age of marriage and maintenance 
for all citizens (Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 
1978; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, sections 125-127). 
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legislation. These changes triggered the Shah Bano Decision by the Supreme Court 
and the subsequent enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 – the only direct legislative interference with Muslim law in 
independent India.42 
 The founding years of the Indian Republic were presided over by Jawaharlal 
Nehru and his Indian National Congress. Both the leader and party drew on a 
hybrid ideology of nation building through accommodation of the multiple values 
that underpinned Indian civilisation. But most of all, good Congressmen knew that 
political power in a democracy flew out of the ballot box; so, complex electoral 
moves determined all major policy initiatives. But the Hindu Code Bill was an 
exception, for enraging conservative Hindu opinion was no obvious vote-winner. 
For Nehru, the religious policy of the state was essentially a means to move 
towards the larger objectives of nation-building and economic development. The 
Constitution of India itself bore ample evidence of Nehru's thinking on religious 
and moral matters. Nehru of course was not alone in advocating a rational modern 
worldview in which religion would play an increasingly residual role, preferring to 
have it retreat to the domain of personal faith in the Indian society of the future. 
This secular policy of the Congress came under a momentary eclipse during the 
extremist period when Hindu concepts and idioms crowded the Congress agenda 
and political strategy. But the rise of the Hindu Mahasabha in the 1920s drew away 
the more extreme advocates of Hindu dominated politics from the fold of the 
Congress just as Gandhi's unique blend of private religiosity with public secularism 
came to be the established policy of the party. Nehru's agnosticism gave his policy 
its final twist during the late 1930s, when nationalism became the major battle cry 
of the Congress against the communalism of the League. 
 Despite his success on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, Nehru, at India's 
independence, already possessed enough administrative experience to realise the 
distinction between wishful thinking (that is, implementation of a uniform civil 
code as he would have liked to, through executive fiat) and hard political realities 
of potential opposition from conservative Hindus and minorities. The paradoxical 
position of the law was obvious, for the commitment to equal protection of law was 
intended to empower all men and women in equal measure with regard to their 
personal rights, regardless of religion. Thus, the laws of the state, which were 
committed to equality and individual rights, flagrantly contradicted the custom of 
the land, whose origins were traced back to sacred texts. The result was the 
dilemma for Nehru and the Congress: How could the state use the power that it 
received from accommodating prevailing social interests to destroy at least some of 
those interests in fulfilling the intentions of the Constitution? 
 In the event, Nehru devised a strategy which consisted of an effective 
combination of political transaction with those opposed to his goals, and periodic 
reassessment of the capacity of the political system to take the load. Thus, on 
problems such as land reforms, the pace of planning and co-operative farming, 
industrialisation, and the creation of linguistic states, Nehru the idealist suggested 
the objectives, but Nehru the pragmatic prime minister of India identified the room 
                                                 
42 See Pearl and Menski, (1998), pp. 201-226. 
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for compromise. The consensus crucial to the system promoted by Nehru's 
Congress party was reached after intense bargaining between interested parties. 
The solution gave some satisfaction to socially dominant interests, which in turn 
extended support to the government. On some other issues, particularly those 
dealing with the secular character of the state, the idealist leader and the pragmatic 
prime minister spoke with the same voice, categorically refusing to yield any 
ground to the interested parties. In the process, Nehru reformulated the agenda of 
the state and restructured the alignment of political forces.  
 The Hindu Code Bill was designed to be part of a general attempt to produce a 
uniform civil code for the country, an intention declared in the Constitution. 
However, in the face of growing resistance from within the Congress party, the Bill 
was withdrawn, thus provoking the resignation of Ambedkar, its most ardent 
advocate. It was reintroduced in piecemeal form after the convincing victory of that 
party in the first general election. In the course of the long debate on the Bill, the 
party ran out of steam and abandoned attempts to draw up a uniform civil code for 
the country. 
 The manner of the passage of the Hindu Code Bills and Nehru's inability to 
extend similar legislation to other communities has been seen as a failure to lead 
the modern state the full length of its secular obligations. However, in terms of a 
different paradigm which casts the state in the image of the classical ruler in India, 
the same episode could be seen as an evidence of the validity of the syncretic legal 
tradition and the accommodation of competing identities as the only basis of 
legitimacy in the Indian context. Nehru as law-upholder, not lawgiver. The decisive 
factor here is the kind of interpretation one makes, and the policy that it gives rise 
to. The crucial argument used to justify intervention by the state in social and 
moral matters in this case remained indeterminate. Where did Nehru's state derive 
its moral authority to reform Hindu personal law? In defending his position, Nehru 
allowed his personal agnosticism to surface in the form of a statesmanlike 
argument for tolerant pluralism, cultural diversity, egalitarianism and a scientific 
outlook. One looks in vain for the arguments that the state should assist Hinduism 
in coming to terms with changed circumstances because Hindu religion is 
institutionally unequipped to do so on its own or that the state, in reformulating the 
Hindu personal law was only discharging its traditional function of articulating 
"righteousness in terms of law and law in terms of righteousness".43 (Derrett, 1968: 
29). 
 The uneasy truce between the state and society on the issue of a uniform civil 
code, struck on the occasion of the passage of the Hindu Code Bill and sustained 
through the complex mechanism of check and balance, and compromise, 
institutionalised in the form of the Congress 'system' gradually lost its holding 
power as the leaders of the first generation after independence passed away, Hindu 
upper castes moved away from the Congress and the hiatus between Hindu 
personal law and that of Muslims began to gain salience in the political market 
place. This was given sudden visibility by the celebrated case of Shah Bano, where 
a divorced Muslim woman asserted her right to alimony under the constitution and 
                                                 
43 Derrett, (1968, reprinted 1999), pp. 29-30. 
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was granted redress at the first instance by the judiciary. A Supreme Court bench 
of two judges took the view that the law was not clear. Therefore, they referred the 
matter to a bench of five judges, headed by Chief Justice Chandrachud, which 
dismissed the husband's appeal and confirmed the decision of the High Court. The 
fact that these five judges were Hindus and the fact that non-Muslims interpreted 
the Qu'ran became the political basis of the controversy that followed.44 Numerous 
demonstrations and riots led to political considerations which in turn contributed 
the rapid passing of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 
1986, which was widely understood at the time to prohibit a Muslim woman from 
going to court to seek a maintenance payment from the man who divorced her. 
 However, we learn from the recent case law, the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) 1986 has done precisely what its name suggests and has proved 
rather beneficial to divorced Muslim wives who were unable to maintain 
themselves appropriately after the  iddat period. The 1986 Act has not taken away 
the divorced Muslim woman's right to claim maintenance from the former husband 
but has in fact strengthened it. The 1986 Act offers a more or less instant remedy 
today to any divorced Muslim wife in India who, at the end of the  iddat period, 
finds that her ex-husband has not made reasonable provisions for her future 
maintenance.45 
 In terms of Muslim personal law, our conclusion about the current legal 
position in India must be that a Muslim ex-husband is undoubtedly expected to 
maintain his wife during the  iddat period and is in addition required to make 
reasonable provisions for his former wife for the period beyond the  iddat period to 
the best of his abilities. We have seen in a number of cases that if such provisions 
have not been put into place by the end of the  iddat period, the wife may have a 
claim under section 3.1(a) of the 1986 Act.46 It remains a sociological reality, and 
will remain a problem of growing dimensions in South Asia, that many poor 
women can expect precious little support from a former poor husband. It is, 
                                                 
44 The following draws largely on Menski (2001) and Pearl and Menski, (1998); see also 
Mahmood, (1985), pp. 110-120. 
45 Menski, (2001), pp. 236-246, Derrett, (1968) reprinted (1999), pp. 29-30, Pearl and 
Menski, (1998), pp. 201-226. 
46 The judicialisation of section 3 of the 1986 Act can be found in a number of High Court 
cases. The Kerala High Court’s detailed verdict in Ali v. Sufaira 1988 (2) KLT 92, not the 
first but an influential decision, arrived at the conclusion that ‘provision’ and ‘maintenance’ 
are not the same thing and that under section 3(1)(a) “a divorced woman is not only entitled 
to maintenance for the period of iddat from the former husband but also to a reasonable and 
fair provision for her future” to be made and paid to her within the iddat period. The judges 
rationale in Ali v. Sufaira is not only crystal-clear but, what is more, it has been endorsed in 
other decisions and by other Indian High Courts, e.g. Aliyar v. Pathu 1988 (2) KLT 446; 
Arab Ahemadhia Abdalla v. Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai AIR 1988 Guj 141; Ahammed 
v. Aysha 1990(1) KLT 172. While the women-friendly interpretation of the statutory 
language has also been rejected (for instance, in Usman Khan Bahamani v. Fathimunnisa 
AIR 1990 AP 225) a recent Indian Supreme Court judgement, namely Noor Saba Khatoon 
v. Mohd. Quasim (1997) 6 SCC 233, seems to endorse silently the interpretation exposed 
by the Kerala High Courts. These issues, and the widespread misconception of the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, are discussed in detail by Menski, 
Modern Indian Family Law, pp. 231-294. 
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however, no longer possible to claim that divorcing Muslim husbands have no such 
responsibility. Thus, the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act 1986 has been from the very beginning, and remains caught in certain 
popular misconceptions and misgivings. The Act is unjustifiably characterised as 
contravening the Constitutional ideals of secularism, legal equality and respect for 
women's dignity. Generally, the Act is presented as reflective of the Muslim 
community's alleged refusal to be governed by the 'law of the land' and symbolic of 
their 'separatist' tendencies. However, recent case law shows that on the contrary, 
under the 1986 Act the entire jurisdiction in respect of Muslim divorcees has been 
transferred to the criminal courts, who assess all the dues of the divorced women 
under Muslim law and thus save divorced women the risk of tedious civil 
proceedings. 
 The new statute law has tried to find a compromise between social welfare 
concerns and respect for the Muslim personal law. It triggered a re-assessment of 
the basic principles of Muslim law in this respect and established a compromise 
between sacred Qu'ranic and modern law. The Indian state has accommodated the 
sacred and the profane by making creative use of the Qu'ranic foundations about a 
husband's sacred obligations to his former wife to establish a tightly framed and 
time-bound system for identifying and implementing the divorcing husband's 
liabilities. 
 The empirical evidence of the social recognition of the new 'equilibrium' with 
regard to personal law in India, resulting from the Muslim Women Protection Act 
can be evaluated on the basis of survey data on the personal law itself, trust in the 
institutions most responsible for the new institutional arrangement, and indirectly, 
in terms of the sense of legitimacy and empowerment of the minorities one notices 
from survey data, and finally, from media reports with regard to the attitudes of 
politicians speaking for the majority community. In order to measure attitudes 
towards personal law, the survey asked: “Every community should be allowed to 
have its own laws to govern marriage and property rights. Do you agree or 
disagree?” 47 One can infer from this data that there is considerable support within 
the electorate for the existing institutional arrangement with regard to the 
simultaneous existence of multiple personal laws. Very significantly, on the whole, 
more people agree with the existence of multiple laws (44%) than disagree (30%). 
The percentages reverse in the case of the voters of the BJP, but only just; the 
tendency to support the current arrangements is very strong in all other parties. 
 Finally, no institutional arrangement can claim legitimacy if it does not have 
the basic support of the main political forces active in a society. It should be noted 
in this context that despite the rhetorical exchanges between the religious 
extremists on the two sides of the communal divide on the issue of the destruction 
of the Babri mosque of Ayodhya, the main difference between the BJP and the 
Babri Masjid Action Committee lies over the interpretation of the events rather 
than the judicial and legislative competence of the main institutions involved. In a 
recent media report, the BJP leaders and Home Minister Mr. Advani "categorically 
committed before the Liberhan Commission that the court verdict on the Ayodhya 
                                                 
47. See Mitra and Singh, (1999), pp. 149-150. 
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issue will be binding on the BJP".48 Under the benign regime of a network of 
constitutional and parliamentary acts, judicial legislation and independent 
commissions, the contentious issues of marriage, family and succession for 
religious groups in India have been taken off the streets and put into the safe 
custody of public institutions.49 
 
A Y O D H Y A :  S A C R E D  P L A C E S  A S  ' R E A L M S  O F  M E M O R Y '  
 
Our empirical analysis to this point has concentrated on conflict over language and 
personal law, both of which, while important points of division in their heyday, 
have now, thanks to appropriate institutional arrangements, made possible because 
of countervailing powers, have become part of the political foundation of civil 
society in India. However, the conflict over the 'disputed territory' in Ayodhya has 
so far eluded such institutional solutions. The unresolved nature of the Ayodhya 
issue helps bring the issue of collective memory as yet another dimension that 
deeply seated conflicts encompass, making enduring solutions conditional upon the 
symbolic healing of remembered violence to dignity, meted out in the form of 
defiling of women, gods and sacred property. 
 Hard-nosed political scientists have every reason to be wary of memory as a 
variable because of the scope for manipulation that so subjective and imprecise a 
factor introduces into rational analysis. Here, the French example is important 
because it helps relativise the Indian case, ever in the danger of being considered  
                                                 
48 'BJP to abide by court verdict on Ayodhya', The Statesman Weekly, 19 May 2001, p. 7. 
Interestingly, the same article reports: "The setting up of the Liberhan Commission was 
'motivated' and it should be disbanded immediately, VHP senior vice-president, Acharya 
Giriraj Kishore said today". 
49 See Mahmood, (1986), pp. 5-6, Menski, (2001), pp. 236-246, Derrett, (1968 , reprinted in 
1999), pp. 29-30 and Pearl and Menski, (1998), pp. 201-226. Articles 15, 25(1), 25(2), 
26(b), 29(1), 38, 44, 246 and 372 of the Indian Constitution provide the judicial basis for 
conflict resolution to the issue of personal law. The case laws and legal precedents are 
particularly rich and can be cited only briefly. The first legislative activity of India’s 
independent Parliament resulted in the new Special Marriage Act, 1954, a secular code that 
was not mandatory but allowed Indian citizens to opt for a civil marriage. In quick 
succession, there followed, after 18 years of committee work and debate, four major 
fragments of the Hindu Code: Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
A second important reform of Hindu law was initiated in 1976, based on the 59th Report of 
the Law Commission, when Parliament passed the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 
modifying the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. What is 
more, there have been very important modifications of Hindu law by local legislators, 
executing their jurisdiction to alter, repeal and amend the personal laws and customs in 
terms of article 372 of the Constitution as this jurisdiction has been shared by the Centre 
and states in accordance with article 246 (read with Entry 5 of List III in the Seventh 
Schedule). The most important local Acts are the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 
1980; Madras Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1967; Kerala Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act, 1958. Further, the central state, by means of changes in the criminal 
law, has rewritten the traditional laws relating to dowry, age of marriage and maintenance 
for all citizens (Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 
1978; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, sections 125-127). 
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sui generis. The concept is used by Pierre Nora and his co-authors in describing the 
major monuments of France which are constitutive of French identity. The 'realms 
of memory' "... produce a multiplicity of interpretations that give new meanings to 
history through what might be termed a form of genealogical revisionism. If a 
'realm of memory' is to exist it must have a capacity for metamorphosis: the 
recycling of knowledge through associations and new symbolic representations. In 
becoming a synonym for national identity, a 'realm of memory' enables successive 
generations to mediate their cultural myths by inculcating them with their 
desires."50  The memory of past humiliation, of defilement of gods and women, of 
lost property play a crucial role in enduring disputes in the Middle East as much as 
in Ayodhya. No interpersonal trust, the indispensable basis of legitimate and 
effective institutions is possible in a society divided by deeply held, wounded 
memories of one group against another.  
 Governance in a morally divided society requires institutions that inspire inter-
communal trust, and can accommodate forces ranged across a cultural divide. 
Institutions can be effective and legitimate only if they are understood and 
respected by both rioters and their victims. In the uncertain moral universe of 
communal politics, tales of torture, rape and violent death are constantly told and 
re-told, and constrain the preferences and strategies of actors depending on the 
context. Sudhir Kakar (1995, pp. 34-35) illustrates his concept of the formation of 
cultural memory with two narratives, related, embellished at every re-telling and 
taken-for-true by the subsequent users of the narratives of the Partition of 1947. 
 
T h e  S t o r y  o f  a  C o u s i n  T o l d  b y  H i s  E l d e r  B r o t h e r  
 
Sohan Lal killed himself on the way to Rohtak. He threw himself in front of a train. 
I could not stop him. We had made all the arrangements for the escape from 
Lyallpur. A Muslim truck driver was ready to drive the three hundred miles to the 
border for six hundred rupees. Sohan Las had been married for only five months. 
He had a very pretty wife. 
 On the day of our departure we went out to make the final arrangements with 
the truck driver. The house was attacked in our absence. When we came back we 
hid on the roof of a Hindu neighbour's vacant house. We watched five husky 
Muslims in our courtyard. They had long butcher's knives stuck in their lungis. 
They were methodically looting the house. The corpse of our youngest brother - we 
were three - lay in the courtyard, the head completely severed from the trunk. One 
of the Muslims sat on a chair in front of the corpse directing the looters. They were 
bringing out the packed trunks from inside the house and throwing them in front of 
him on the ground. The ground was cluttered with wedding sarees and coloured 
silk blouses. I can still see the shining brass pots lying on their side reflecting the 
rays of the afternoon sun. We could not move. I was transfixed by the sight of the 
leader's hairy torso of which every inch was covered y a thick black fur. Then two 
of the Muslims went inside the house and brought out Sohan Lal's wife and the 
                                                 
50 Lawrence Kritzman in his foreward to Nora, (1989), p. XIII. 
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leader pulled her to him. She sat on the man's lap, naked to the waist, her petticoat 
ripped open, and the Muslim's hairy hand, like a giant back spider, covered thigh. 
After laying her on the ground next to our brother's corpse, where drops of blood 
still oozed from the severed neck, raped her in turn. I was holding Sohan Lal fast, 
my palm covering his mouth. If he had made the slightest sound the Muslims would 
have discovered us. But I do not think Sohan Lal would have done anything. His 
legs were buckling under him and I had to hold him up. After they finished, they 
ripped open her belly. Sohan Lal never said a word after it was all over and the 
Muslims had gone. In the days it took us to cross the border he remained mute. I 
tried my best to make him talk, to make him shed some of his grief in tears but his 
soul remained far away. He killed himself just before we reached Rohtak." 
 
Kakar explains how, if the previous narrative is one of desperate and impotent 
rage, the one following is the type to send a rush of blood through the veins, and a 
surge of potency in the tiny groups of refugees, fleeing the violent pogroms of 
West Pakistan, huddled in cramped circumstances, desperately seeking to move 
from humiliating victimhood into the dignity of survivors. 
 
T h e  c o u s i n  f r o m  L a h o r e  
 
"We did try to retaliate, at least the younger Sangh [Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh] members like me. And of course the Sikhs. A police inspector told me of 
going to a Sikh village where there was a reported massacre of the Muslims. As the 
police entered the village they passed under a kind of welcoming arch which was a 
rope strung out between the poles. To this rope, attached with short pieces of 
string, were the circumcised penises of all the Muslim men who had lived in the 
village, hanging there as if they were small eels drying in the sun." 
 
Rape (or gang-rape, in the brutally precise words with which the police and media 
often report it) is the last argument in the violent discourse of communal conflict. 
Presented as factual accounts, these anecdotes are no doubt constructed by each 
narrator to suit the specific context and purpose. The latter can be simply a 
cathartic expiation of guilt, sublimation of anger, or simply an act of self-
redemption for the lone individual, located away from his organic, primordial 
group. For the entrepreneurial ethnic leader ensconced within his kin group, the 
narration can be a means of political mobilisation. Facilitating conditions like a 
pre-existing dispute on ownership of a religious site, religious practices considered 
offensive or provocative, or a drastic change in the macro-political environment 
that affect the relative power of communities account for the relative success or 
failure of such attempts. 
 In the face of communal riots, a knee-jerk response of the secular academic and 
the functionaries of the modern state has been, speaking from the commanding 
heights of the state as a fixed point, to counsel the actors to behave otherwise. The 
(Justice) Raghubir Dayal Commission on the Ranchi-Hatia riots in 1967 observed: 
"The political parties should change their attitude in approaching the people for 
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their gain, especially in elections. They should not exploit communal and caste 
feelings for their purposes. No political, economic or and caste-feelings for their 
purposes. No political, economic or cultural issues would be discussed or agitated 
from a purely communal angle. Communal harmony should be taken to be too 
sacred to be tampered with for mere political gain." (cited in Rajgopal, 1987, p. 72)  
 Kakar and Davis remind us that conflict over identity and exclusive space is at 
the core of inter-community violence. We need to understand sixteenth century 
France to be able to restore to rioters their sense of agency and then think about 
neo-institutional solutions. Collective rage is about the denial of legitimacy by the 
authorities (the state and the church) to what the 'saint-soldier' (in the evocative 
phrase of Mahmood) considers morally right, about the denial of dignity to 
symbols one holds as sacred, about the chance to wrest back control over a 
designated territory or area where one can see one's sacred symbols safely 
ensconced. Not surprisingly, the longing for an exclusive territory is the main 
object of communal conflict.51 
 Every riot sharpens the separate identity of communal groups and particularly 
the identity of the minority groups. The process by itself whether it is intended or 
not, promotes the role of communal leadership and gives it an extra dimension. 
Thus over a period of time, communal leadership develops a vested interest in 
communal riots, as with every successive riot the demands and reliance on the 
communal leaders increase.  
 However, if the Kakar's accounts of cultural memories and chosen traumas are 
seen as key to the sadistic and sexual violence that characterises communal riots, 
this kind of moral exhortation is likely to make little impression. We need therefore 
to look closely at political conflicts that in the past have sparked off violent 
communal riots but have over time, ceased to have the same political and moral 
significance in order to understand how this transformation has come about. 
 The protracted political and legal controversy over the exclusive right of 
ownership and worship over a site of 2.77 acres in Ayodhya is the third of our 
empirical examples of contested identities as challenges to governance. The 
primary actors in this case are the Ramjanambhoomi Trust of Ayodhya who claim 
this spot as the sacred birthplace of Rama, and the Babri Masjid Action Committee 
which wants to re-establish its right as the sole owners of the land where the Babri 
Masjid once stood. Over the past ten years the specific conflict had assumed the 
dimensions of an iconic symbol far beyond the original claimants. Thanks to the 
electronic media and the enduring presence of the articulate protagonists in 
political and electoral discourse, for many Hindus beyond the immediate vicinity, 
in fact, even beyond the North Indian heartland of the cult of Rama, Ayodhya has 
now become a site of cultural memory, of centuries of abiding faith in the face of 
political defeat and desecration. For the Muslim defenders of the claim, it is test of 
the ability of the political system to protect their dignity and cultural identity, an 
                                                 
51 "As a general proposition, communal riots occur in places where neither of the 
communities has a preponderance in numbers. More riots occur in districts which have a 
Muslim population varying between 15 percent and 59.3%." Rajgopal (1987, p. 19) 
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ever-present chosen trauma which has increasingly assumed the proportions of a 
meta-narrative of the Islamic identity and majority communalism. 
 It is not difficult to see why Ayodhya has emerged as the most important 
communal divide of India after independence. Its impact is felt more widely and 
keen than language or personal law in their times. The electronic media and the 
globalisation of Indian politics surely account for part of the difference in the 
salience attached to it. But the decisive roles are played by the cultural memory of 
Hindu-Muslim conflict into which it has been firmly locked, and the coalition 
structure of Indian politics which causes most of the debate to be held in the public 
arena rather than within the entrails of the Congress party as in the case of 
language or personal law.  
 Ayodhya questions the post-independence resolve of the Congress party to 
deflect attention away from the location of cultural values and historical memories 
in the public arena. It located the search for legitimacy in the twin principle of 
individual rights and protection of minorities. This entailed a constitutional design 
committed to denying hegemony to any religion. Political mobilisation on 
Ayodhya shows how, as the message of democracy spread, the issue of 
acculturating India's public arena has become increasingly trenchant. Ethnic and 
national minorities now challenge the state and its capacity to accommodate 
conflicting identities by demanding neutrality  vis à vis the majority community as 
well as genuine recognition and active support for their cultural and religious 
identity. This is resisted by those who speak in the name of the majority 
community, demanding the recognition of their core values in the public sphere. 
 How does a society segmented on the basis of tribe, caste, religion, language 
and a number of other considerations institutionalise itself into a multicultural 
state? In the wake of the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party to power in the central 
government at the head of a coalition, and its recent attempts to 'Indianise' 
education, few questions polarise Indians as much as the iconic issue of Ayodhya. 
Unlike economic development which became the main issue of public debate 
immediately after the achievement of independence, the issue of nationhood in 
post-colonial India came into the mainstream of national politics only in the 1980s. 
Compared to her South Asian neighbours India is very much a case apart in terms 
of the comparative lateness of the public debate on nationhood. Unlike 
neighbouring Pakistan, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, right from the outset the 
Constitution of India did not go far enough in defining the core beliefs of the 
nation.52 (this sounds like a value judgement, would it be better to eliminate “did 
not go far enough” and replace it by “did not go as far as”?)Though, as mentioned 
before, the supreme law of the land spoke both of the rights of individuals and 
primordial groups but provided no consistent guide lines as to why the state should 
support one or the other in a specific context.53 However, five decades of full, free 
                                                 
52 The basic values of the Constitution are defined in the Preamble. The word 'secular' was 
added subsequent to the formation of the Constitution, through an amendment in 1976. 
53 Thus, while the rights of the individual to equality were to be seen as a fundamental 
value, milk cattle were to be protected in the interest of the agrarian economy and the 
tradition of devadasis to be suppressed for the sake of morality and religious minorities 
were to be provided for with regard to their separate educational establishments. 
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and uninhibited competitive politics following independence has succeeded in 
putting the ambiguity implicit in this fuzzy definition of multiculturalism to test, 
forcing an alternative in the form of a nation based on Hindutva.54 That alternative 
is the source of great anxiety to 'secularists' who see in such arguments a dangerous 
portent towards the rise of 'Hindu fascism'. But, this secularist argument on its own 
does not advance a theory of a multicultural state in India. For, besides 
mechanically repeating that India is a secular state and should remain so, the 
secularist lobby offers no satisfactory theory of the nature of the Indian nation and 
its relation to India's culture and religions. 
 The relevance and urgency of the issue for contemporary India can hardly be 
over emphasised. From the nineteen eighties Indian politics has polarised 
dangerously on the issue of religion and politics. Fuzzy concepts like 'unity in 
diversity' as the cultural basis of a tolerant pluralism in India, or the Congress 
System, based on consensus and accommodation are no longer seen as acceptable 
and sufficient guarantees of India's national unity and integrity as a state.55 At heart 
of the issue today is: what kind of nation underpins the state in India, and, what 
resources do the post-colonial state and society in India possess in order to sustain 
multicultural nationhood in India? 
 The nascent Indian state, with fresh memories of the Hindu-Muslim riots that 
marked independence and the partition of India, attempted to find an institutional 
solution for the problem of the accommodation of religious differences within the 
institutions of the modern state through the twin concepts of sarva dharma 
samabhava (equal attitudes towards all religions) and dharma nirapekshata 
(religious neutrality). Secondly, it made every effort to acknowledge the salience of 
individual rights to freedom of religion and equality before the law, and group 
rights to cultural and religious practices in its charter of fundamental rights. The 
post-colonial state thus made attempts to accommodate both the fact of the 
existence of several religions which played a salient role in the social life of her 
citizens and to assuage the apprehension of non-Hindus of a possible Hindu 
majoritarian dominance. This created what can be termed a fuzzy notion of 
multiculturalism, to distinguish it from radical multiculturalism which required the 
state to explicitly acknowledge the existence of plural identities in the public 
sphere, and from various forms of mono-culturalism which promotes the culture of 
one social group to the detriment of others by putting its language, religion and 
status to a hegemonic position within the structure of law and administration. 
 In retrospect, however, underneath the superficial consensus on the meaning 
and applicability of the concept of 'secularism' to Indian conditions, controversy 
raged from the outset. The inconclusive nature of the 'cow slaughter' issue during 
                                                 
54 This is defined as the common denominator of Indian culture by its proponents who insist 
on adherence to its values as the basis of citizenship in India. The Indian Supreme Court 
has accepted Hindutva as a manifestation of Indian culture rather than being synonymous 
with the Hindu religion. 
55 Of the two mainstays of the fuzzy Indian nationalism, 'unity in diversity', the main 
ideological device, lies in the rubble of the Babri mosque and the second, the 'Congress 
System', which served as its institutional base, after successive electoral defeats, now firmly 
belongs to Indian history. 
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the 1950s, the incomplete character of the project of a unified personal law for 
India, the 'text book' controversy of the first Janata Party governments and the 
celebrated Ram Janambhoomi issue from the nineteen eighties which ultimately led 
to the violent clash of Ayodhya all bear testimony to this deeply embedded 
problem (Mitra 1991).56 At issue is the inconclusive nature of the solution to the 
problem of incorporating multiple religious identities within the structure of the 
state. While short term calculations of political opportunists certainly play a role in 
giving particular salience and virulence to each of these issues, their consistent 
appearance in time and space point towards factors that go beyond the exigencies 
of everyday politics. Advocates of modernity like Nehru sought to reduce the 
salience of this problem on the national political agenda by making a non-issue out 
of it, or by promoting the spread of 'rational thinking' through science and 
technology and social reform which they fondly hoped would make these 
traditionalist opposition to modernity disappear. But, looking back to the fifties and 
considering from that vantage point all that has happened since in this specific area, 
one is inescapably driven to the conclusion that in terms of its political significance 
and philosophical basis, the issue multiculturalism rightfully belongs to the agenda 
of the high politics of values and institutions of the post-colonial state in India. 
 
J U D I C I A L I S A T I O N :  S U R R E P T I T I O U S  A C C U L T U R A T I O N  
O F  T H E  P U B L I C  S P H E R E  
 
The political discourse on Ayodhya entered a new phase with the instruction of the 
Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court to the Archaeological Survey of India 
to "excavate the disputed Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid site" in order to 
establish, on the basis of archaeological evidence, "whether there was a Ram 
temple at the site, and if the mosque was constructed after its demolition."57 
Reactions to the court order were predictably diverse. The Muslim Law Board held 
that "the [archaeological] evidence would not be of much value". The 
Ramjanambhoomi nyas held the excavation as unnecessary because the recently 
concluded radar survey had thrown up "evidence of Ram temple". The Viswa 
Hindu Parishad, while welcoming the court order suggested that "similar directions 
should be passed in respect of other shrines destroyed by invaders." The Congress 
party saw the order as "part of the judicial process for the final adjudication of the 
                                                 
56 For a discussion of the debate surrounding cow slaughter and the Hindu Code Bill, Lloyd 
and Susanne Rudolph, ‘Cultural Policy, the Textbook Controversy and Indian Identity’ 
(1982); for the textbook controversy Arun Shourie, Indian Controversies: Essays on 
Religion in Politics (1993) and K.R. Malkani, The Politics of Ayodhya and Hindu-Muslim 
Relations (1993) for the conflict surrounding the birthplace of Rama and its implications 
for Indian politics. 
57 "Ayodhya site to be excavated: Court gives ASI a month to finish job2, in Hindustan 
Times, (New Delhi), March 6, 2003, p. 1. The three-member bench consisting of justice 
Sudhir Narain, Justice Rafat Alam and Justice Bhanwar Singh issued the order on the basis 
of evidence of the likely existence of a structure under the demolished mosque on the basis 
of a radar survey. The court order, while seeking factual evidence behind the myth of the 
Ram Temple was particular about making sure that the status quo with regard to worship 
and ownership are not any way affected by the process of excavation. 
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dispute."58 Despite their differences, however, no voice of disagreement was raised 
questioning the institutional framework within which the Ayodhya dispute is 
ensconced, though at least one dissident voice in the media suggested a political 
compromise between the parties in conflict as a better solution than 
judicialisation.59 The wheels of countervailing forces have been set in motion 
again, giving credence to the Indian 'model' in matters of contested identities. 
 The involvement of the judicial process with the issue of identities and 
governance should be seen the context of a landmark judgement on the issue of the 
status of Hindutva as a part of Indian culture.60 The important point to note is that 
the Supreme Court acknowledges the tolerant pluralism and syncretism of classical 
Hinduism; is willing to concede the imperative of a common culture for the public 
sphere of the state; and is unconditional about very specific and context bound 
interpretations of the references to religion. Thus, the mention of religion by itself 
is not taboo, but the use of religion for the purposes of discrimination, incitement to 
hatred or disharmony (referring to Muslims as snakes or lande) bring the matter 
under the provision of Indian penal code. The court's understanding of culture and 
context appears to have evolved way beyond the early years after independence 
when an invocation of modernity was considered enough. 
 The Court came to this conclusion in a circuitous way. "Any speech wherein 
expression 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduism' are used, irrespective of their meaning, cannot 
by itself fall within the ambit of sub-sec 3 of section 123, unless the speech can be 
construed as an appeal to vote for a candidate on the ground that he is a Hindu or to 
refrain from voting for a candidate on the ground of his religion, i.e., he is not 
being a Hindu, mere reference to any religion is an election speech does not bring it 
within the net of sub-sec 3... since reference can be made to any religion in the 
context of secularism or to criticise any political party for practising discrimination 
against any religious group or generally for preservation of Indian culture." (paras 
34-35) The justices were however very particular about stating the secular 
character of the state as part of India's core values. 
 "When it is said that politics and religion do not mix, it merely means that the 
religion of a candidate cannot be used for gaining political mileage by seeking 
votes on the ground of the candidate's religion or alienating the electorate against 
another candidate on the ground of the other candidate's religion. It also means that 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 "This is the time for sensible politicians to step in, before the courts are forced to 
intervene with a sub-optimal solution", for a court imposed order which would inevitably 
create winners and losers  would leave a trail of bitterness on the part of those who would 
"lose face" in consequence. R Jagannathan, "Ayodhya - courts aren't the answer," Business 
Standard (Delhi), 11 March, 2003, p. 7 
60 AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1113 (from Bombay) J.S. Verma, N.P. Singh and K 
Veknatasami, JJ. Civil Appeal N. 2836 of 1989, D/- 11-12-1995. Dr Ramesh Yeshwant 
Prabhoo, Appellant v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and others, Respondents, WITH 
(capitals?) Bal Thackeray, Appellant v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and others. 
Respondents. 
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the State has no religion and the State practises the policy of neutrality in the 
matter of religion." (Para. 16) 
 
The following paragraphs reinforce these arguments.  
 
In secular polity, the requirement of correct behaviour or propriety is that an 
appeal for votes should not be made on the ground of the candidate's religion 
which by itself is no index of the suitability of a candidate for membership 
of the House. Thus, seeking votes at an election on the ground of the 
candidate's religion is a secular State, is against the norms of decency and 
propriety of the society. The fact that the scheme of separate electorates was 
rejected in framing the Constitution and secularism is the creed adopted in 
the constitutional scheme, are relevant considerations to treat this as a 
reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression, for 
maintaining the standard of behaviour required in conformity with the 
decency and propriety of the societal norms. The words 'decency and 
morality' in Art 19(2) cannot be restricted to sexual morality alone." (Para 
28,29,30, 31,32) 
 
H A R M O N Y ,  A C C O M M O D A T I O N ,  T R U S T  A N D  G O V E R -  
N A N C E :  S O M E  C O N D I T I O N S  O F  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  
 
Evidence from elite discourse and public opinion in India help us identify the 
empirical conditions for civil society in the context of deep divisions. A narrative 
from an elite interview61, (fortuitously conduced in Godhra, in 1999, before it 
achieved its current reputation as a salient landmark on the landscape of Hindu-
Muslim conflict) gives an idea of the nature of the ground reality with regard to  
communal violence. When asked to name a specific incident from experience 
which had an implication for governance and how he had coped with it, the 
respondent narrated the following: 
 
Curfew was imposed in Godhra for three months. On Jan 3, 1991, 10,000 
women gathered on the main road and created a traffic jam for six hours. 
They were agitating about [alleged] third degree [treatment] by the police on 
the private [parts] of some Muslim in communal connection. The accused 
was brought before the magistrate the previous evening and asked about the 
third degree treatment. He had said no. But the women were blackmailing 
the police, making useless allegations against them. The DSP, SRP group 
commander and Home Minister were to arrive. The women wanted to create 
a scene, jumped on the jeep of the DSP, wanted to videograph the scene, to 
distort the lawful action of the police. When they did not yield to persuasion, 
action was taken with [tear] gas, and after warning, a lathi charge was made 
when police were stoned. The police took decisive action, without consulting 
                                                 
61 Baroda (Gujarat), 1999. The interviewee was a male Hindu (Brahmin), with an MA in 
Politics, who held a senior position in the police. 
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higher-ups. The lathi charge on women was a very painful decision but very 
effective which was the need of the hour. Next day, the police deployment 
was decreased, peace returned, the situation became normal and curfew was 
ended. 
 
Firm policing, our interlocutor holds, saved the day for governance. How confident 
can one be, however, to construct an enduring image of law and order from this 
fortuitous turn of events? The insights one can glean from the rest of this interview, 
and inferentially, from others with managers of law and order do not indicate a 
firm basis for governance in conflicts of this genre.62 The respondent considers "the 
law and order situation in the country as a whole", to have deteriorated over the 
past five years and agrees to the statement that "compared to five years ago, life 
and property are less safe than before." He is slightly more optimistic about the 
situation in his own State where he holds "governance over the past five years" to 
have been medium. The most pressing problem of governance in his State is that 
"bureaucrats have no control over politicians." The latter, "not properly trained", in 
his opinion, should carry the larger part of the blame for their failure to play an 
"integrative role in society", for the continuation of problems such as drinking 
water which obliges "women in Kutch and Saurashtra where women have to walk 
for 2-3 KM to get water", and for the "law and order situation which is not as good 
as it is made out to be, [with the continuation of] atrocities on women and 
communal riots." The respondent's general opinion of political parties, the key 
agent of governance in India, leaves no doubt for the reasons of his pessimism. The 
activities of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Bajrang Dal have "caused 
governance to decrease", "the Congress is thoroughly corrupt, not able to address 
the youth" and "Muslims have lost faith [in the political system] on account of the 
Ayodhya problem".  
 Governance in Indian context, as the previous chapters have argued, assumes a 
key role for the politician to set the agenda and hold the bureaucracy and police 
accountable to the society for its implementation. As such, when the agent of law 
and order management casts a vote of no confidence in politicians and the political 
system, the result is a bleak prognosis for democratic governance.  
 Godhra, even before it acquired the national prominence that it did after the 
incident of 2002 has prior history of communal tension and the inference one might 
make from a particular interview in this context needs to be relativised with 
reference to the larger picture. We shall attempt to do so in relation to a few 
questions from the National Election Survey of 1996. 
 The first questions selected from the 1996 national survey for this purpose refer 
to the illegitimacy of violent action as a part of everyday politics, and, the 
commitment of the state to defend the plural character of the country through the 
protection of minorities.   Is struggle leading to violence proper or not a proper 
                                                 
62 This substantiates similar inferences by Rajgopal and Wilkinson. The involvement of 
militating Muslim women in defence of human rights gives a particular piquancy to the 
larger theme of the empowerment of social margins and governance, which will be treated 
at length in the next chapter. 
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method for fulfilling people's demands? refers to the legitimacy of violence itself. 
Only 13% of respondents see violence as a " proper method for the people to fulfil 
their demands" whereas 65% hold that "struggle is not a proper method if it leads 
to violence". Since law and order is the primary responsibility of the regional 
government, variation on regional lines is interesting. Among the study regions, 
Bihar and Tamil Nadu, each with 22% approval of the legitimacy of violence, are 
well above the national average. At the next level are Maharashtra and Gujarat, 
each at 17%, not as high as Bihar and Tamil Nadu, but still above the national 
average. Punjab at 8% and West Bengal at 9% are two States with a violent history 
but at the moment of study, well below the national average.63 
 State or society, whom do Indians hold as primarily responsible for the defence 
of the minority communities? A strong majority of 63% of all respondents support 
the statement - It is the responsibility of the government to protect the interests of 
the minority communities. Do you agree this or disagree? with no great variation at 
the regional level, though Punjab at 49% and Haryana at 23% remain ominously 
below the national level.  
 The next battery of questions selected for attitudinal evidence of support for 
tolerant pluralism concern intercommunal accommodation on a number of 
important issues with regard to India's communal cleavages. The first of these 
concerns Ayodhya.  Some people say that the demolition [of the Babri Masjid] was 
justified while others say it was not justified. What would you say -was it justified 
or not justified? The results reveal a picture that one does not come across in the 
media. For the respondents as a whole, those taking the position that the demolition 
of the mosque was unjustified (38%) largely outnumber those justifying it (23%), 
but those who do not have an opinion (39%) are actually the largest group. Left-
leaning West Bengal has the largest number of respondents (58%) asserting that the 
demolition was unjustified. Only in Bihar, (a Hindu-Hindi-heartland region though 
with no significant support for the BJP) do the 'justified' (41%) outnumber the 
'unjustified' (32%). 
 Despite the attempts of the religious right, both Hindu and Muslim, to give a 
communal complexion to the violent separatist movement of Kashmir, the survey 
results reveal considerable support for its resolution through negotiation (35%) 
rather than through the use of military force (11%). Similarly, on the communally 
emotive issue of efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan by India, 45% 
of the respondents agree with the proposition compared to 17% who disagree. On 
the issue of the issue of discrimination against India's Muslims, posed in a neutral 
manner (The needs and problems of Muslims have been neglected in India), there is 
far more disagreement (43%) as compared to agreement (19%). Finally, on the 
issue of every community being allowed to have its own laws to govern marriage 
and property rights, agreement (44%) exceeds disagreement (31%), with Gujarat 
(74%) and Punjab (59%) appearing with support well above the national average. 
In addition to institutional arrangements at the national and regional levels and 
attitudes of communal accommodation or polarisation on communally sensitive 
                                                 
63 The space available here precludes a more detailed analysis of the regional variation but 
we shall come back to this theme in the next chapter. 
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issues, the perception of group relations at the local level provide yet another 
window into the communal situation in the country.  A battery of items, posed to 
the national electorate in terms of specific questions help locate variation in social 
harmony across different cleavages (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Perception of social harmony and conflict at the local level 
National Election Study, 1996 (% agree) 
 
Theme Agree D.K. 
 
Disagree 
Relationship between different castes has become more 
harmonious. 
62 19 19 
Tension between tribal and non-tribals has increased. 19 56 25 
Tension between different religious communities has 
decreased. 
43 31 26 
Tension between dalit and non-dalits (Harijan and non-
Harijan) has increased. 
27 37 36 
Tension between landowners and landless has decreased. 33 40 27 
Now there is more tension between rich and poor. 37 25 38 
The poor and deprived enjoy better social status now than 
before. 
48 22 30 
Condition of the poor has improved during last five years. 48 12 40 
 
 Noticeably, while there is a general recognition that the basic cleavages of 
caste, class and religion continue to be effective in polarising opinion, the 
cumulative effect of legislation, policies of the welfare state and political 
competition have helped to dent the bitter edges of antagonism. These results have 
been achieved through firm and imaginative intervention from civil servants in 
sensitive and volatile context, occasionally at considerable personal risk. The elite 
interviews have yielded a rich harvest of examples. In one case64 the ability of the 
                                                 
64 The respondent - Jagadip Narayan Singh - aged 38, is a male Rajput Hindu. He has a 
M.A. in International Studies. He is IAS Officer and was Secretary to CM, 1997 (for 8 
months). Currently, he is MD in Gujarat Industries Power Company Limited. In 1991, 
when respondent was DM of Junagarh, he averted a major communal conflagration through 
persuasion and negotiation tactics with the Muslims (see attached sheet for details). This 
success gave respondent tremendous confidence and he was also given the Best Collector 
award in 1991, 1993 by the State Government. 
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district magistrate to negotiate rather react with overwhelming force made the 
difference. In the second case65, firm handling of a potentially violent clash with 
Patels, an affluent community won the day for governance. The respondent reports: 
 
During 1986-87, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)... wanted to capture power 
in Gujarat through  apolitical, violent means. The method(s?) adopted were 
(a) stop supplying mild and vegetables (b) road blockage. Though defiant of 
the above, violet attacks from BKS who also gave a call for "gamra bandh" 
and burnt all village buses where upon hundreds died. At that time the 
respondent was collector, Sabarkantha, which was dominated by rich patels 
who were also political leaders and who brought the popular theme of free 
electricity to the people. Due to the road blocks and Ram Janaki Rath Yatra, 
large levels of violence were experienced, involving the masses, and 
paralysing the state. The activists of the BKS gheraoed the Assembly, 
government machinery was helpless as shooting orders couldn't be given. 
Political leaders like Jinabhai Darji and Madhav Singh Solanki were 
attacked in Dhansura and near Chi,ora in Saharkanta. The tense situation 
was difficult to tackle; so, 'silent measures' were adopted by the respondent, 
like arresting the Zilla Panchayat Presidents and Taluka Panchayat 
Presidents and relatives of MLAs who were responsible for creating tension 
and violence in the district. The telephone calls from dominant politicians of 
Gujarat were not succumbed to. On 10th February 1987 and later again in 
June, the Assembly was ghearaoed and some MLAs were attacked which 
resulted in a major showdown between the BKS activists and the 
administration. In Saharkantha, 5 leaders of BKS, mostly Patels, were 
arrested (the respondent called the now released leaders and invited them to 
have an informal chat with him on Friday. Four out of five came - they were 
told that "they should do their jobs and he would do his", i.e., protecting the 
people of the state and that his information is that all violence in the state is 
created by them. He went on to say that they would be shot (believing in 'one 
bullet, one body theory') if any further single incident of violence took place 
within the borders of Saharkantha. At that time they took his words seriously 
but when they went back home they found their villages cordoned off by the 
police. So they went to Gandhinagar, joining lakhs of BKS followers where 
full police firing took place. 22 died from Saharkantha including some young 
Patel boys aged 18-19. The situation was tense with the deaths. Orders to 
the SDM were given by the respondent that as soon as the dead bodies 
arrived they were not to be handed over to the relatives but had to be 
cremated immediately, as the sight of them might result in heightened 
emotions and continuous violence. Cremation of all, except the son of a big 
mill owner had taken place (between mid-night and 2 AM - to avoid the 
crowd) when the SDM was attacked (his eye was damaged) yet the body was 
not handed over to the relatives but cremated later by the administration. 
                                                 
65 Gujarat #3, Gujarat, 2003. The respondent, aged 43 is a male Hindu, scheduled caste, 
with a wide range of administrative experiences. 
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The above experience was a great challenge to governance in the 
respondent's opinion, as he was successfully averting violence and 'gamra 
bandh' largely in his district within the laid down rules. Many a times it 
meant a direct confrontation with the political big wigs. He attributes his 
success to having excellent relations with the police and also his strong 
belief in doing one's job well and "meaning business." he says, if one means 
business, the other side checks its powers." 
 
Earlier in the interview, the respondent (a double outsider to Gujarati society and 
its high politics being originally from South India and, additionally, of scheduled 
caste origin) had described the "deterioration of law and order, communal violence 
and the loss of harmony, and too many socialistic and populist schemes 
imbalancing growth" as the main problems of governance in Gujarat. There is 
certainly an element of a personal project, of one man doing his job well by 
exercising authority when and where it is needed in his narrative of governance. It 
is the presence of such able and alert cogs in the gigantic wheel that Indian 
administration has become that sets the pace for governance in the regional arena. 
The causal nexus between these factors, as perceived by the electorate at large can 
be seen from the following multivariate analysis (table 2). 
 The variables used for this correlation are based on the questions about the 
legitimacy of violence, the perception of the protection of minorities as a 
responsibility of the government, social harmony and accommodative attitude 
towards social pluralities (calculated through the summation of attitudes towards 
the salient, communally divisive issues) and trust which represents the average of 
all the trust questions, already discussed in the previous chapters. These variables 
have been correlated with another, as well as with the perception of law and order 
over the past five years. 
 
Table 2: Multiple correlation of culture variables with law and order improved 
 
variables Law and 
order 
Harmony Violence Minority Accom-
modation 
Trust 
Law and Order 1      
Harmony .17** 1     
Violence NS .06** 1    
Minority NS .08** .07** 1   
Accommodation .04** .05** .01** .25** 1  
Trust .18** .15** .11** .13** .14** 1 
* significant at .05 
** significant at .01 or less 
 
The positive and significant correlation of these variables provide a popular echo of 
elite attitudes and strategic choices with regard to governance. But the story is not 
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one of uniform good faith or goodwill. A Punjab narrative66 shows the other face of 
mechanical and damaging police brutality. The respondent, aged 58, is a female 
Sikh belonging to the Jats. She has a Jsc Medial and a BA in English. She was born 
in a big landlord family. Her father had very closer relations with Nehru via 
philanthropic work for the Dalits.  She was a member of the Consumer Court in 
Punjab, the Central Social Board, the Public Women and Child Development 
Corporation, the Governing Body of the State Red Cross, the State Child Welfare 
Council, the Bharatiya Gramin Mahila Sangh at the State level and was, at the time 
of the interview, the Chairperson of the Public State Women's Commission. She 
narrated the following as her personal experience of challenges to governance. 
I had a driver named Amrik Singh Kauli. He was with me since he was only 
11 years old. I brought him up. he was a very innocent and honest boy. 
During the period militancy in the Punjab (1991-94) the police on the behest 
of opposition politicians levelled false charges against him and he was 
declared a militant. He was brutally beaten by the police. This made him a 
real militant. He killed a number of people including Mr Balwant Singh, 
former Finance Minister of Punjab. Later he was killed by the Punjab police 
by staging a false encounter. 
 
I found the detached undertone of the interview, its clinical precision with regard to 
the analysis of a personally painful incident and locating the responsibility for 
governance failure at the lower level of the administration (in this case, the thana), 
fascinating. She returns to politics as the source of possible solutions to the 
problems of governance. One can see in her positive evaluation of the role of 
political parties more than the bureaucracy or the police the explanation for her 
continued commitment to the institutional core of the political system. 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
The lone assassin, stalking his celebrity prey, remains a by-line in the history of 
political violence. Participants in collective violence in most situations are ordinary 
people, engaged in extra-ordinary behaviour for the duration of the riot, pogrom, 
uprising, insurgency or individual acts of terrorism, retreating into the safety of 
their homes and collective memory after the event. Of course, peer pressure, fun, 
profit, the temptation of easy pickings or fear of reprisal are relevant factors that 
help explain the behaviour of many of the participants. At the core, however, there 
remains, as Natalie Davis reminds us, the issue of a 'legitimacy deficit', a sense of 
moral outrage where ordinary people have a sense of a profound wrong, and having 
been let down by those who have the power to do something about this which 
makes them take the law into their own hands.67 The outraged become rioters and 
                                                 
66 Punjab, interview #6, 1999. 
67 "Was the destruction merely the outcome of senseless mob violence or did the rioters 
have a serious religious or political objective?" Based on the findings of Rude with regard 
to who was responsible for the Gordon riots, Gilmour shows evidence of careful targeting 
of Roman Catholic places of worship and properties. The fact that "it was not the Catholic 
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the riot definitively subsides once the root cause of the outrage has been 
satisfactorily removed through symbolic and substantive action in terms of new 
institutional arrangements and an authoritative re-allocation of values. The 
survivors become citizens all over again, living cheek-by-jowl with their 
neighbours, connected through institutional links across cultural or religious 
chasms. 
 The coexistence of institutional stability at the national level with vigorous 
challenges to lawful authority at regional and local levels is a salient feature of 
Indian democracy. Paradoxical as it might seem, the more the system has been 
challenged, the stronger it seems to have become. Robust, even contentious 
political participation eventually turns adversaries into stakeholders.68 While this is 
generally true of conflict based on caste, class and language, communalism, 
particularly in the extreme form of communal riots question this transactional view 
of Indian politics. 
 Scholarly writing on communalism often concedes too easily to anxiety and 
resignation instead of taking the tools of historical and comparative analysis as far 
as they would go. Our findings, particularly from the narratives from semi-
structured interviews with the regional elites show how legitimacy deficit is the 
main explanation of the fury of the crowd in communal violence. Seen in this light, 
the Indian actors of communal violence join their counterparts from religious 
violence in history. But, though, as we have seen in the study of Natalie David, 
whereas the French religious mobs are recognised as political actors by their 
historians three centuries later, the Indian counterparts of the French religious 
crowds have done less well at the hands of their historians, both the indigenous and 
the expatriate. The contrast is remarkable, for one would have thought, thanks to 
the proximity in time and greater accessibility of the sources, the scholarly toil of 
the historians of communal conflict in contemporary India would have been more 
enlightening of the motives that unleashed such passion and fury rather than mere 
platitudes and moral condemnation.69  
 
                                                                                                                            
population as a whole that was singled out but Catholics of substance" shows a combination 
of religion and class antagonism to be the dominant motive. Gilmour, op.cit., pp 359-360 
68 Naipaul's Million Mutinies Now is the most celebratory expression of this theme. 
Elsewhere, I have attributed the resilience of Indian democracy to the dynamic character of 
the post-colonial state (Mitra, 1991), the tradition of rational protest (Power, Protest 
participation) and federalisation as a method of state formation in India. (Subnational 
Movements in India). 
69 Ironically, this orientalist contempt for the subject, evocative of Said, is homegrown 
rather than occidental in origin. In the final analysis, there is no other explanation for the 
difference in treatment of the western and non-western religious rioters except scholarly 
contempt for the capacity of the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Buddhist crowds to engage in 
rational action, and the failure to appreciate the powerful appeal of the religiosity of these 
religions on the minds of men and women, just like the Catholics and Protestants locked in 
mortal combat three centuries ago. That some of these negative readings are actually 
provided by scholars from the same racial origin as the rioters, who, despite their common 
origin fail to see what was obvious to their subjects, only goes to show how solid and 
secure the hold of orientalism on the imagination of otherwise intelligent men and women. 
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Drawing on the Indian experience with the rise and resolution of problems of 
identity based on language and personal law, this paper has argued that communal 
conflict is not natural, necessary, inevitable or inexorably destructive of 
governance and civil society but is capable of accommodation through new 
institutional arrangements. The recognition of the problem and its comprehension 
through the discourse of the actors, and the transformation of this knowledge into 
effective policy through countervailing forces hold the potential for an orderly 
solution. With regard to the applicability of these solutions in the context of liberal 
democratic societies operating within the core values of capitalism and 
globalisation, there are two caveats. In the first place, the successful 
accommodation of contested identities entails a shift of focus from a culture of 
ownership to the ownership of culture on the part of the actors themselves. In the 
second place, it is best to be weary of the 'healing touch' of vote and attention 
grabbing politicians, susceptible only to the creation of greater pessimism and 
cynicism because such attention usually fades away once the glare of publicity and 
media attention move away to greener pastures. It is more important to innovate 
institutional measure that can make survivors out of victims. The world will not be 
same again for the victims of gang rape, but the construction of the narrative might 
vary depending upon the symbolic and substantive measures taken by the state. 
The objective of state policy in this case should be to juxtapose the present and the 
past through a meticulous reconstruction of events leading the one to the other and 
reconcile subterranean wounds through symbolic acts (as in the Truth Commission 
of South Africa) and institutional arrangements (as in France and England).   
 The achievement of this modest target in India is far more complicated than 
one thinks. The difficulty of bringing citizenship into a model of governance are to 
be traced partly to the origin of many of its institutional apparatus in utilitarian 
thinking which could accommodate concerns for security, welfare and participation 
but not for issues of identity.70 On the specific issue of symbolic action intended to 
make survivors out of victims, Indian record has been abysmal. No attempts have 
been made in India to institutionalise symbols or methods that would elevate the 
victims of communal violence into dignified citizens secure in their identity. There 
have been no South African style Truth Commission, the Holocaust Museum, the 
elaborate trials of the authors of atrocities and other symbolic acts by the state that 
transform the victims of violence (The authors of the 1984 anti-Sikh pogroms in 
Delhi are still to be brought to justice). The shame, anger and rage of the victims 
have thus remained trapped in a collective memory of defeat and humiliation, a 
timeless myth evocative of a longing for vengeance and heroic self-sacrifice for the 
'cause'. 
 With hindsight, the startling conclusion one comes up with is how little public 
debate there was in India after independence about the lack of fit between acquired 
                                                 
70 Commenting on the discourse of legitimacy and order in such cases, Susanne Rudolph 
says, "...as we address the state in Asia [as indeed the state per se] we must treat the 
symbolic as a phenomenon. We must try to create theoretical frameworks that combine a 
demystified, rationalist worldview with an understanding of the phenomenology in 
societies where the gods have not yet died." Rudolph, (****), p 742 
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colonial institutions and the cultural values of society. No consistent attempt was 
made to derive or to adopt the principles of government to local and regional 
cultural and political traditions. Ronald Inden has criticised this essentialized view 
of the modern state in South Asia as a "nation-state that remains ontologically and 
politically inaccessible to its own citizens" (1990: 197-198), a sentiment whose 
echo one finds every so often in the narratives of policemen and administrators. 
From the point of view of scholars and statesmen for whom a strong, modern state 
in India, reinforced by institutions like the separation of religion from the state is a 
fixed point of analysis, all outbreaks of public disorder and violent secessionist 
movements are seen as 'misguided', and, possibly, as 'acts of the foreign hand'.71 
However, seen from the perspective of the political actors, who see themselves as a 
wronged people, anti-state violence is a necessary step in the direction of a 
preferred future. (Juergensmeyer 1994) A theory that takes the actor seriously must 
incorporate the actor's perception of reality as an endogenous variable in its 
operational model. 
 One can, however, discern the winds of change in India with a degree of 
optimism. India still lacks her equivalent of the German  Verfassungsgericht or the 
French  Conseil Constitutionel, but the Supreme Court, as we have seen in the 
hindutva judgement, has begun moving in the direction of the recognition of the 
dangers of a hiatus between state and society with regard to the core values of the 
political system. The analytical focus has begun shifting from the state and its 
decision-making elite in the direction of the sense of collective identity of the 
ordinary citizens and the trust they have in the authority of the institutions of the 
state. A convergence between the individual's sense of the sacred and his notion of 
the core values of the state enhances governance: a hiatus between the two spells 
disaster. High sense of trust by the individual in public institutions endows the state 
with high legitimacy and generates governance: the opposite reduces actors into 
criminals and the state into a hollow shell. 
 Far more abstract than the policeman on the beat or the canvassing candidate at 
the door, the deceptively simple variable of common citizenship, is crucially 
indispensable for governance. State planners keen on enhancing governance 
through security and welfare need to take note of the bond of common citizenship 
that binds the individual with the state, and link public authority with the sense of 
identity and morality of the ordinary citizen, and ties present reality with memories 
of the past. Citizenship in a deeply divided society is a product of the 
accommodation of identities. As such, it is more a process than a product for it is 
not easy to isolate its active core from substantive issues like language, religion and 
shared history once and for all. 
 Nehru's predicaments, discussed earlier in this paper, hold a lesson for students 
of governance. The Indian state, successor to the utilitarian origin of British law, 
aimed at the creation of a network of public institutions for the enhancement of the 
 
71 The point is made by Saberwal (1986). For the allegation of a conspiracy to destabilize 
India with the collusion of foreign powers dominated the political rhetoric of Indira Gandhi 
in the 1970s, see Bharat Wariavwala, 'Security Issues in Domestic Politics', in:  Mitra and 
Chiriyankandath (1992), pp. 125-136 
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common good. Like their British predecessors, India's rulers were aware that 
culture was the Achilles' Heel of the state. By nature it was beyond the scope of the 
state and yet, the failure to govern culture would be to open a chink in its legal 
armour. The colonial policy of honouring local custom but keeping high culture off 
the agenda is not an option available to the modern Indian state. But such 
acculturation, it has been argued in this paper, can only be done surreptitiously, or 
in the bland language of the constitution. 
 A common civic culture has been promoted by the state, to the tune of even 
adding a clause regarding fundamental Duty Regarding Language – Art. 51 A(e) to 
the Constitution. The 42nd Amendment Act 1976 introduced under the new part IV-
A the Article 51 A(e) which specifies that it shall be the duty of every citizen of 
India to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the 
people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional 
diversities. The 'constitutionalisation' of this salient political issue, and 
consequently, its 'depoliticisation' is the general argument that underpins the 
empirical analysis of the empirical evidence drawn from opinion data and elite 
discourse. The cycle of judicialisation-constitutionalisation-depoliticisation that 
followed the articulation of the language conflict and personal law offers 
precedents to a similar attempt at the judicialisation of the role of religion within 
the framework of a multi-cultural society in India. Through the successful attempt 
to institute language both as the basis of identity through a combination of 
constitutional, legal and administrative provisions, India's lawmakers have shown 
the way to the solution of problems considered not amenable to rational discourse. 
Identity thus joins security and agency as the three foundations of governance and 
civil society in India. 
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